With Scott Galloway, Prof G Conversations
A conversation between Scott Galloway and Ian Bremmer about the state of global affairs, covering the wars in the Middle East and Ukraine, China's economic challenges, and the recent U.S. election.In this wide-ranging discussion, geopolitical expert Ian Bremmer discusses several major global challenges, including the Israel-Gaza conflict, the Russia-Ukraine war, China's economic struggles, and the recent U.S. election (prior to the election). The conversation explores the concept of global leadership vacuum, the implications of China's "managed decline," and how different U.S. administrations might handle international crises. Bremmer also addresses the changing nature of global alliances and the rise of autocratic tendencies in international politics.
Timeline:00:00 - Introduction
01:00 - What steps could help fill the global leadership gap, and who's most likely to lead?
02:38 - Is a world with diverse, independent powers healthier, or does global stability rely on having one or two superpowers leading the way?
04:35 - What's your view on the Middle East conflict right now?
08:32 - What role do Iranian oil revenues play in funding groups like Hamas and Hezbollah?
10:16 - How is the Middle East conflict impacting Russia and Ukraine?
14:07 - What's happening on the ground in Ukraine right now?
16:22 - What do you mean by China's 'managed decline'?
19:45 - Do you think the changes in U.S.-China relations over the past few years reflect a deeper shift in global dynamics?
22:18 - How would Harris and Trump differ in their approach to the Middle East, Ukraine, and China?
28:54 - Do you believe there can be 'good wars' that lead to stronger alliances and lasting peace?
34:28 - Are military actions in the Middle East creating more terrorists despite their intended goals?
39:12 - What are your predictions for the upcoming election, considering it's a toss-up?
43:54 - What are the dangers of an autocracy when it comes to influencing powerful figures like Jeff Bezos?
Transcript:
Scott Galloway (Q): Ian, where does this podcast find you?
Ian Bremmer (A): I am at home right now in New York. I'm going to go to my office right after this.
Q: Let's bust right into it. You recently delivered your anticipated 2024 State of the World speech in Tokyo. You outlined major themes shaping the geopolitical landscape: the wars in the Middle East and Russia, China's managed decline, the impending U.S. election, and AI. You said we should be most worried about the absence of global leadership. What do you think is driving this leadership vacuum? And who, if anyone, is poised to step in?
A: I don't think anyone is poised to step in right now. You look at the Middle East-despite being the most powerful ally of Israel, the U.S. has been hands-off, and the Israelis are making decisions as they see fit. Similarly, China is Russia's most powerful global ally but has had no meaningful impact on Russia's actions in Ukraine. The leadership we see today is national, not global. Most countries are focused on domestic issues, especially when their citizens are unhappy with their direction. This dynamic is evident in elections worldwide.
Q: Is it better to have a diverse ecosystem of independent powers, or does global stability require one or two superpowers leading the way?
A: It's a more uncertain world. Countries like Russia, Israel, North Korea, and Iran prefer the absence of global leadership because it lets them act without constraints from international norms or alliances. That said, the U.S. and China remain the most significant powers. The U.S. has been unwilling to push outcomes, as seen with Israel, while China's proclaimed support for Ukraine's sovereignty means little in practice. Neither country is deploying significant effort or political capital to ensure the outcomes they claim to support, and I don't see that changing soon.
Q: Let's move to the Middle East. What's your view on the conflict there right now?
A: As of today, oil prices are down 6%, signaling that the latest escalation is over. Israel hit back at Iran after waiting almost a month, causing more damage to Iran than Iran did to Israel. While some initial acts, like the assassination of Hamas's political leader, weren't performative, much of what followed was. For example, Iran gave the U.S. advance notice before their strikes, ensuring minimal damage. Israel's response was also restrained, partly due to U.S. diplomacy and incentives like fast-tracking missile defense systems for Israel and sanctioning Iranian oil tankers.
Q: Why didn't the U.S. cut off Iranian oil exports earlier, given their role in funding groups like Hamas and Hezbollah?
A: Iran is exporting over a million barrels of oil daily. The U.S. has previously argued that cutting off Russian oil exports might spike prices and trigger a global recession. But that's not true for Iran; OPEC has spare capacity to cover the shortfall. The real reason is reluctance to sanction Chinese institutions buying Iranian oil, as China could retaliate economically. Still, I believe the U.S. could and should have done more earlier to cut off Iran's funding.
Q: Let's talk about Russia and Ukraine. Has the Middle East conflict taken Western focus away from Ukraine? Where do things stand now?
A: Yes, in the U.S., Ukraine has dropped in priority, but not in Europe, where the focus remains relentless. Europeans are spending more on Ukraine than the U.S. and recognize they'll need to step up further if Trump returns and cuts off aid. On the ground, Russia is regaining momentum. Ukraine's recent push into Russian-held territory was a symbolic victory but left their own front lines weakened. Russia has since gained more ground in the Donbas region and inflicted significant damage on Ukraine's energy infrastructure, making the upcoming winter even harder.
Q: What do you mean by China's "managed decline"?
A: Both the U.S. and China are trying to avoid a sudden crisis while managing a deteriorating relationship. The U.S. has its hands full with two wars and an election, while China's economy is performing worse than at any time since the early '90s. Provincial governments are bankrupt, real estate is in crisis, and their 5% growth target is out of reach. The economic mismanagement is reminiscent of their abrupt zero-COVID policy reversal. This time, it's leading to overproduction, rising unemployment, and even social unrest, with violent crimes and high-profile suicides becoming more common.
Q: Do you see U.S.-China relations reflecting a deeper global shift?
A: Yes. Western multinationals are quietly reducing their exposure to China, and China's overproduction is straining global relations. The economic and political freeze between the two countries is deep, with no signs of thawing soon.
Q: As we head into the U.S. election, how might the outcomes affect the Middle East, Ukraine, and China?
A: A Harris administration would likely maintain continuity with Biden's policies-strong support for Israel, a NATO-aligned approach to Ukraine, and efforts to stabilize U.S.-China relations. Trump, however, would take a more unilateral approach. In the Middle East, he'd likely support a more aggressive Israeli strategy, even against Iran. On Ukraine, he'd push for a ceasefire on terms favorable to Russia, potentially cutting off support for Ukraine. With China, he'd focus on tariffs and take a transactional approach, but China's economic struggles make them prefer the stability of a Harris presidency.
Q: Do you believe there can be "good wars" that lead to lasting peace and stronger alliances?
A: Yes, though they are rare. World War II was a good war, as was the First Gulf War defending Kuwait. Ukraine's war is also a necessary one, but the Israel-Palestine conflict is more complex. While Israel has achieved military successes, the humanitarian toll is staggering and could foster more radicalism in the long term. The U.S. has also lost influence globally due to its unqualified support for Israel, particularly in Muslim-majority countries like Indonesia and Malaysia.
Q: What are your predictions for the upcoming U.S. election?
A: It's a toss-up. The global trend is dissatisfaction with incumbents, favoring change. Structurally, this should benefit Republicans. However, Trump is uniquely unfit as a candidate. If I had to bet, I'd say Trump wins narrowly because he's playing offense while Harris and the Democrats are on defense, which doesn't mobilize voters as effectively.
Q: Is it better to have a diverse ecosystem of independent powers, or does global stability require one or two superpowers leading the way?
A: It's a more uncertain world. Countries like Russia, Israel, North Korea, and Iran prefer the absence of global leadership because it lets them act without constraints from international norms or alliances. That said, the U.S. and China remain the most significant powers. The U.S. has been unwilling to push outcomes, as seen with Israel, while China's proclaimed support for Ukraine's sovereignty means little in practice. Neither country is deploying significant effort or political capital to ensure the outcomes they claim to support, and I don't see that changing soon.
Q: Let's move to the Middle East. What's your view on the conflict there right now?
A: As of today, oil prices are down 6%, signaling that the latest escalation is over. Israel hit back at Iran after waiting almost a month, causing more damage to Iran than Iran did to Israel. While some initial acts, like the assassination of Hamas's political leader, weren't performative, much of what followed was. For example, Iran gave the U.S. advance notice before their strikes, ensuring minimal damage. Israel's response was also restrained, partly due to U.S. diplomacy and incentives like fast-tracking missile defense systems for Israel and sanctioning Iranian oil tankers.
Q: Why didn't the U.S. cut off Iranian oil exports earlier, given their role in funding groups like Hamas and Hezbollah?
A: I think it's a really good question Scott. I mean they're exporting right now over a million barrels a day, and the typical argument you'd give - and this is the argument the Americans have quietly given over the last almost three years for why Russian export of oil has not been cut off - I mean America's friend the Indians are buying an obscene amount of Russian oil some of which they're refining and then sending on to Europe, and the reason that wasn't cut off is because the US is concerned that that would spike oil prices and lead to a global recession.
That's just not true with the million barrels that the Iranians are exporting. OPEC has over a million barrels right now that they are holding back. I mean what's driving prices, which are pretty low, is the fact that there isn't a lot of demand and particularly the Chinese economy is performing so poorly - Chinese consumption. So given all of that, there's not a really good argument for why you want doing more to cut off Iran, which is why I said I'm a little surprised that the Biden decision to hit these ships with the transponders - they didn't do that - why didn't they do that six months ago, nine months ago? Like why are you letting the Iranians export illegally?
Now some of that getting all of that million plus off the market would have also involved probably sanctioning some Chinese institutions that the Americans have been loathed to do because China is a lot more powerful and has the capacity to hit you back. So I mean there's definitely some narrow economic self-interest playing out here, but I am in the camp that more can and should have been done to cut off Iranian export absolutely.
Q: Russia Ukraine - where are we going? What do you think 2025 holds for Russia Ukraine? Has the Middle East conflict taken Western focus away from Ukraine?
A: By people, you mean Americans, because Europeans are relentlessly focused. They're spending more overall and they have been than the United States - something the Americans probably don't appreciate. And they recognize that if Trump comes in and cuts off the Ukrainians, they are going to have to do more, and I think they will. Is it enough for the Ukrainians? That's another question, but this is and will remain a much more existential issue for most of the Europeans who see not only that in many cases they've got a border with Ukraine or a border with Russia, but also they're engaging in all sorts of asymmetric fighting with Russia directly.
You know, I mean if you go on Telegram, I mean the Russian GRU, I mean their spies are paying lots of money for locals, Russian speakers, ethnic Russians in many countries across Eastern Europe to engage in acts of espionage, vandalism, arson, other criminality - you name it. This is a war that is being fought on the ground in Europe. It's well beyond disinformation. So they are focused like a laser on what happens going forward, and that conversation, the conversation across Europe has not slipped to the Middle East - it is focused on Russia Ukraine, where in the United States Russia Ukraine is a decided number two if even that.
I'll tell you one thing that I think the media has gotten wrong recently, and because it's attracted a lot of headlines I think it's worth you and I going into for a couple minutes, is the North Korea angle. People are talking about North Korea and saying it shows desperation that Russia's going to get 10,000 troops from North Korea and it means they really can't fight, they can't go anywhere else, they're scraping the bottom of the barrel. In the broad scheme of things, 10,000 poorly trained troops from North Korea being sent as cannon fodder to the front lines who don't speak the Russian language, won't be effectively trained or integrated, matters almost none to the fighting.
What the North Koreans have done that really matters is a solid majority of all the artillery that is being used against Ukraine and the ammunition being used against Ukraine - that is North Korea. And that means the war - North Korea is absolutely the war machine behind what's happening on the front lines right now and that's been going on for months and months now.
What's interesting about the North Korean decision to send troops is it really solidifies a military alliance that Russia has now signed with North Korea. It's made them closer to North Korea than the Chinese are. The Chinese are not aware of what the details of that military agreement comprise and they're deeply discomforted by that. And historically of course the Chinese are the ones that called the shots for Pyongyang if anyone did. So that's what's really different here. And the fact that they are a nuclear weapon state that is developing aggressively much more advanced technology including like nuclear submarines that the Russians are clearly helping them with, advanced ballistics, maybe even some space stuff - that is a serious problem. And that's something that the Russians are 100% behind.
Q: What has happened on the ground? Have the Russians been making progress? Is it a stalemate or is the Ukrainian Army pushing back? What's the state of play on the ground?
A: The big thing that happened, the spectacular thing that happened a couple months ago is the Ukrainians decided to take almost 40,000 well-trained troops and send them into Russian territory of Kyiv, which they have taken and they have held much of. They are now losing territory to the Russians, but the Russians have largely ignored that, they've referred to it as terrorism internally, and they have instead sent more troops inside Ukraine and they are taking more of the Donbas, which is now less well-defended.
So I would argue, and most NATO leaders would argue, that this was Zelenskyy both with the flair for the spectacular to show that the Ukrainians can still do very unexpected things and cause pain for Putin, and also getting desperate because they're increasingly recognizing that they aren't going to have the capacity to keep fighting the way they have for the last 2 and a half years. This is a dangerous move for them, this makes it a lot harder for them to hold their own front lines with the Russians having already taken about 22% of the country and threatening to take a lot more.
So if you ask me over the next 3-6 months, I think that there's a much higher likelihood that the Russians take all of the Donbas and that is going to lead to more displacement and also reduce morale on the part of the Ukrainians. Russia's also in the last couple of months done unprecedented damage to Ukraine's critical energy infrastructure as winter approaches, and that's going to make it a much harder winter for the average Ukrainian. Only about 40 million people live in Ukraine right now - there was over 50 million before the war - and those numbers I suspect are going to continue to go down over the next several months.
Q: You refer to China's "managed decline" - that's your term and I like it. What do you mean by that?
A: I'm talking in part about the relationship between China and the United States. We are heading towards confrontation, but both countries are trying to avoid sudden crisis and ensure through a lot of high-level communication that the relationship doesn't deteriorate any faster than it needs to and any more broadly than it needs to. The Americans are doing that, I think, in part because we've got our hands full with a couple of different wars and an election cycle. The Chinese are doing that because their economy is performing worse than I've ever seen it, certainly since the early 90s, maybe since the 70s.
I was just in Beijing a couple of weeks ago. I spent the week there and every provincial government is bankrupt and real estate is in crisis. That is 70% of Chinese consumer wealth and about 30% of Chinese government revenue, and they're not going to come close to their 5% growth target this year. This is a new Chinese economic leadership put in place by Xi Jinping - they are suddenly telling the president "we're not going to be able to perform like we told you we were." Not a good place to be on your first year, and that's also the 75th anniversary of the Chinese Communist party.
So there was a lot of panic going on among the top economists a couple weeks ago in China, and that's why they're all trying to run around and say "what do we do, what kind of stimulus do we put in place?" It was the same kind of transition that we saw when they went from zero COVID to suddenly overnight "we're just going to rip up the QR codes and everyone can do what they want." Remember Scott, for a year, a solid year, this was Chinese officials crowing internationally about how they cared about their people and the Americans didn't, the Europeans didn't, the Japanese didn't - "we didn't take care of our citizens, we let them get sick and die, and the Chinese were the one country that really cared" - and they literally ripped that up overnight. It was as if they had nothing to do with zero COVID.
So the Chinese leadership got it wrong, they didn't get good information, and now for the second time in only a few years we're seeing the same thing - that the Chinese leadership thought they had like a decent control on their economy, thought it was just incremental challenges that they'd be able to effectively respond to this year, nothing major required, and then suddenly almost overnight realizing that isn't the case at all.
Q: How do you see U.S.-China relations reflecting a deeper global shift?
A: If you are a big Western multinational with exposure in China, you don't want to make announcements that you are making layoffs, you don't want to make announcements you're taking money out because you know that will get you punished by the Chinese. But quietly, everyone is trying to reduce exposure. The only part of the Chinese economy right now that is actually performing and keeping their numbers up is the manufacturing sector, and it's manufacturing without consumer demand, so there's massive overproduction right now.
And that's leading - that's not politically sustainable in other parts of the world. It's causing backlash, you know, complaints of dumping, all of this sort of thing, and it's making the relationship between China and other countries more confrontational. So they're really in a corner here - they're going to need structural reform. It's essentially a major financial crisis.
And in fact, the one thing that I was quite surprised by when I was in China was just how much violent crime there is right now. A lot of people talking about stabbing and people driving their cars into crowds and high-profile suicides - and some that got public notoriety and then immediately taken down off of WeChat, and some just people talking about things happening in their own neighborhoods, happening on their own street corners, that sort of thing.
Now I mean if this was happening in any normal country around the world - and by normal I mean a country that you get reporting out of, information out of - it's all we'd be talking about. But because it's China and because very few people go to China right now - I mean there just there's nowhere near the level of travel that you saw pre-COVID - and because the Chinese don't actually report on any of this stuff, we're not really talking about it. And that's a really big deal.
Q: Let's do some scenario planning. How do these three things - the war in the Middle East, the war in Ukraine, and the impact of China's managed decline - play out differently in a Harris or a Trump Administration?
A: So Biden has been one of the most strongly pro-Israel candidates we've ever seen - presidents - and it is unclear that Harris would significantly alter that. She's made repeated statements that the alliance between the US and Israel is sacrosanct and US will do everything to defend Israel. She clearly is much more concerned about the Palestinians, about their ability to self-govern, about getting them humanitarian aid. I think some of that is because of the changing demographics of the United States on Israel-Palestine, young people in particular being much less motivated by a pro-Israel policy, much more sympathetic to the Palestinians. And some of it is that as a lawyer, she's just generally more interested in rule of law and international norms and feels like the Americans are supporting a policy that undermines that and that undermines US influence around the world. So I suspect that under Harris, US policy on Israel-Palestine would be more aligned with the Europeans than it is right now.
Where with Trump - I mean actually if anything he is a little more hawkish than even Biden. He's indifferent to what happens to the Palestinians. He says he no longer supports a two-state solution, though he did when he put together the Abraham Accords. And he was the guy that of course recognized the Golan Heights as Israeli territory, he moved the embassy to Jerusalem, he has no problem with further illegal settlements of Israel on the ground in the West Bank. I suspect that he would be fine with a more assertive and expansionist Israeli military strategy in the region, including against Iran's nuclear capabilities, which he might be inclined to help Israel with. So there's a little bit of a difference there but it's not dramatic in my view.
Russia-Ukraine is much more different. Now both Harris and Trump would want the war to end, but their modalities would be very different. Trump is much more of a unilateralist - he's not interested in coordinating with the Europeans at all. He would call Zelenskyy and call Putin and basically say "you're going to end this war, you're going to accept a ceasefire territorial delineation where it is right now." Or else what? With the Ukrainians, or else we cut off support. With the Russians, or else we sanction you a lot tougher.
Would he follow through on that? Would the Ukrainians and the Russians listen to him? Interesting question. Certainly a better deal for the Russians than they're getting presently or than they'd get under Harris, but that doesn't mean that Putin would find it acceptable. There's a big difference between Trump's rhetoric with Russia in his 2017 presidency and actual policy towards Russia, which was harder line - the javelin anti-tank missiles to Ukraine, tougher sanctions than it was under Obama.
So I think that what was clear is if Trump became president again, the Europeans would feel very much cut loose from this process and that would be a crisis for Europe. If Harris comes in, she would want to coordinate a policy towards Ukraine that would lead to a ceasefire, but she would coordinate that with NATO and then take that joint policy with the Ukrainians if she could make it happen and try to get everyone to force Russia to the table. Would that work or would that just be a continued drip drip drip as the Russians continue to fight? Very interesting question, hard to know. But certainly Biden's policy on Russia-Ukraine has been great in keeping the alliance together, hasn't been so great for the Ukrainians long term.
And then if you want to go to China - Jake Sullivan, the National Security adviser, went to Beijing a few weeks ago, spent 14 hours with Wang Yi the foreign minister, then he spent an hour and a half with Xi Jinping, and the purpose of that trip was to ensure a stable transition in policy if Harris becomes the president. I spent an hour and a half with Wang Yi when I was there a couple of weeks ago - he told me he was very appreciative of the effort that Jake and the Biden Administration have put into the relationship, the time, the communications and the rest. So I think that if Kamala were to become president, I think that US-China policy would remain very consistent with where it is right now.
Trump, of course, sees China policy and sees much foreign policy through a more economic and transactional lens, through the lens of tariffs. He has talked about a 60% across-the-board tariff on Chinese exports. Six months ago, 12 months ago, China wasn't sure if they would prefer Harris or Trump - Trump might be someone they could do a deal with. Trump also will antagonize a bunch of allies, creates more flexibility for the Chinese potentially. This trip, everyone in China says we want Harris. Why? Because the state of their economy means they can't handle the uncertainty.
Q: What are your predictions for the election, considering it's a toss-up?
A: As someone who looks at the world more than I look inside the United States, the common thesis this year is "throw the bums out." We're not happy with where our country is going, we want somebody different. We just saw that in Japan this weekend - stable Japan. We've seen it, you know, even in India where Modi is so incredibly popular but has to govern in coalition, South Africa, UK, Austria, Germany, France - I mean you name it around the world, this is what we're seeing.
So this election in the United States, with inflation having been high - and now it's coming down but the prices haven't gone down - and illegal immigration having been really high - and now it's coming down but the illegal immigrants are all still here - you know whoever is holding the bag is probably going to lose. So ex ante, your view of this election should be it's a change election and the Republicans should win.
Having said that, Trump is the least attractive, least fit candidate the Republicans could possibly run. I mean any other Republican candidate would win easily in my view, certainly against Biden and against Kamala Harris as well. But Trump is not any other candidate - he is a uniquely unfit candidate, and therefore it's a tossup.
And if you ask me, if I had to bet, I guess I would bet that Trump is going to win by a really slim margin because I ultimately think that structural "vote for something different" really matters, and it seems to me that the Harris Democrats are playing defense and Trump's playing offense, and on balance, defense doesn't turn out the voter as effectively. But those are very soft theses in an environment where everything is within the margin of error.
I'm more worried about the disinformation environment. I'm more worried about how Americans - I mean, you're right that the two candidates are so different because the people that are supporting the two candidates believe completely different things, and it's getting worse and worse and worse every day. And we see it in our mainstream media, Lord knows we see it in our social media. I mean we even saw it in the response to FEMA and the hurricane, we saw it in response to the pandemic, and now it's in our election. If you're a Dem or a Republican, your views of what matters and what is true has never been more different than your fellow Americans since the Civil War. And I think that's what's driving these candidates being so radically different, and that bodes badly for what happens to the US after next Tuesday.
Q: Just going back to incentives - and this will be my last question or thesis - the dangerous thing about an autocracy, and why it's so effective... I see it again with Jeff Bezos. It appears he was incentivized or forced - supposedly a representative of one of his companies was meeting with Trump and there was pressure applied to someone you would think would be immune from pressure in a capitalist society, being the third or fourth wealthiest person in the world. The story running around was that he was essentially pressured into pressuring The Washington Post to not issue an endorsement. This is the danger I see of an autocracy - that the upside of supporting this person, I don't want to say it's bigger with an autocracy, is you get the sense he's a bit of a kleptocrat and will do money good for you regardless of the Constitution or the DOJ to pay you back, and on the flip side go out of his way to use the full power and influence of the government to prosecute his political enemies. Whereas if you don't support Harris, the downside I see is much less because I think she has respect for the law and she's not going to go after her political opponents - they might not get appointed to be Ambassador, but she's not going to weaponize the DOJ against them. So all of the incentives on a risk-adjusted basis - I see these heads of investment banks, I know they support Harris but I keep seeing them hedge their bets because they're worried that Trump would be more punitive in loss than Harris. I see this as just - I never recognize just how effective autocracy is, the perception of a lack of concern for the law. Your thoughts?
A: Yeah, and it's because people are insufficiently valuing the importance of democratic institutions and rule of law - those are long-term things that they don't care enough about. And America's really good - capitalism is really good at valuing short-term things, but not long-term things, not public goods, not negative externalities.
And I mean, you remember after January 6th, there were a lot of American CEOs that finally said "you know what, we've got to value this - if you were a member of Congress and you refuse to certify a free and fair election, those are table stakes for democracy, we're just not going to - our PACs aren't going to give you money anymore, that's it." And you and I know a lot of the CEOs that made those decisions, and I was glad they did it. That didn't even last a year. And it's not because those members of Congress apologized and changed their behavior - it's because, well you know, it's kind of convenient, we want to like give him money again and you know let's get in the game and we, you know, our competitors are going to do it. And it was such tweeny behavior.
I mean again, this is from someone - these are from companies that didn't need to do it. Jeff Bezos doesn't need - he is wealthy enough, powerful enough, he can stand up. You know, it wasn't comfortable or convenient for me to go after Elon when he did something that I thought was really problematic - he's not an enemy I need, believe it. But I can't live with myself, if I can't be honest about what I think on the global political stage - like that's just who I am. And if I lose money for that, who gives a shit? It doesn't matter. I lose a client for that? I don't care.
But you know, I do think that if you spend all of your time - I mean maybe the problem with a person like Bezos is once you become that rich, the only way you become that rich is by that becoming the only thing you value, right? It shows that money is the only thing that is truly important for you - that is what you orient all of your time and being towards. And if that's true, there's not much space in your value set for valuing democracy, rule of law, a community, a family, any of those things. And therefore, you know, having his guys get the meeting and telling the people at the Washington Post to go scratch - it does reflect who he actually is as a person.
But you know, we as America are incenting a lot of the wrong kinds of behavior by lionizing someone like that as a captain of USA because they are not leading by example. That's pretty clear.
