Debate Magazine

Yom Kippur War: Critical Aspects

Posted on the 01 October 2023 by Arirusila @AriRusila

Israel learned not to ignore the signs of approaching war and bask in the euphoria of the achievements of the past, however great they may be. But the signs of peace should  not be ignored either.  (President Isaac Herzog, 2023)

The Yom Kippur War, also known as the October War or the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, was a significant conflict that took place from October 6 to October 25, 1973, between Israel and a coalition of Arab states led by Egypt and Syria. On October 6, 1973  —  in the middle of the holiest day on the Jewish calendar — Egypt and Syria launched an attack against Israel along the Suez Canal and in the Golan Heights. The 1973 war broke out, catching Israelis utterly by surprise and wreaking terrible losses before Israel’s military was able to regain the upper hand. 

The following article highlights some critical aspects about the events leading up to the war and the setbacks of the first few days.

Yom Kippur War: Critical Aspects

Panorama commemorating Egypt’s triumph in the October 6th, Cairo

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Panorama commemorating Egypt’s triumph in the October 6th, Cairo

Wrong presuppositions

Israeli leaders had believed that the next war would look the same as the previous one. But the gravest mistake was the embracement of a concept, promoted by then-defense minister Moshe Dayan, that Egypt would not attack unless it had first matched Israel in airpower. 

“Concept”—a preconception held by the Israeli Intelligence Community (IC), which dictated that the Arab states would not initiate a war against Israel that they could not win. On an operational level, Israeli adherence to what became known as “The Conception” prevented a coherent formulation of military defensive (or more importantly, offensive) measures. The Conception consisted of two assumptions held with respect to any attacks against Israel by the Egyptians and/or the Syrians. First, it was assumed that Egypt would not go to war until she was able to stage deep air strikes into Israel, particularly against her major military airfields, in order to neutralise Israel’s Air Force. Secondly, it was thought that Syria would not launch a full-scale war against israel unless Egypt was in the struggle too. This preconception proved wrong, and sticking with it up to the last minute a fatal mistake.

Israeli inability to incorporate indicators that did not fit into their paradigm led to the misconception that the Arabs can’t win a war under current military preparedness, therefore, they will not initiate one.

The basic Israeli premise was that Egypt faced a binary choice: total war or truce. As it happened, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat chose a third option. Egypt’s initial war objective was to use its military to seize a limited amount of Israeli-occupied Sinai on the east bank of the Suez Canal. This would provoke a crisis which would allow it to bring American and Soviet pressure to bear on Israel to negotiate the return of the rest of Sinai, and possibly other occupied territories, from a position of relative strength.

The second assumption, that regarding Syrian intentions, grew out of the Israeli belief in Arab disunity. Because military activities on the two borders had never been synchronized previously, Israel had been “desensitised” to the developments that were taking place just prior to the sixth of October.

Also there was no consensus after 1967 war on what Israel’s final borders should be, and, as a result, no consensus on how to preserve. Lack of clarity about national goals obscured strategic thinking.

Overconfidence and underestimation of the enemy

This assumption was accompanied by a significant and exaggerated sense of overconfidence brought on by Israel’s surprise military victory in the 1967 Six-Day War.

Analysts’ steadfast reliance on their preconceptions, despite contradicting information, was directly responsible for the failure.  On the Friday before the war started Israel intelligence received the information that the Russians were withdrawing their personnel from the Middle East.  Another officer in the field wrote a memo questioning the exercise thesis that his superiors refused to send up the chain. Meanwhile, conflicting data was explained away: when Israel learned that the Soviet Union was evacuating its citizens in Egypt and Syria on October 5, the IDF chief of staff speculated it was due to a Soviet-Arab dispute; Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan chalked it up to misplaced fears of an Israeli attack.

Spreading rumors and misinformation at every opportunity, the Egyptian forces sought to deceive the IDF at the strategic, operational and tactical levels. Egyptian claims of inadequate maintenance and lack of spare parts caused Israeli tactical commanders to believe they would face ragged tanks that would break down under the strains of battle. 

An overconfidence effect also played a role. Research shows that feelings of confidence do not necessarily correlate with accurate judgments. Chief of Staff Gen. Elazar summed up this dynamic when he told his staff, “We’ll have one hundred tanks against [Syria’s] eight hundred. That ought to be enough.”

In the first phases of the 1973 war, the IDF fought the previous war. It relied heavily on the air force although the latter was severely constrained by the Egyptian anti-aircraft batteries, and it attempted to change the course of the war by using tank formations without adequate support from auxiliary forces.

Israeli military leaders had felt that they had found the perfect mix of weapons and tactics to defeat any enemy. Utilising a blend of highly mobile armour and total air superiority, the IDF held themselves to be nearly invulnerable.

Utilising captured Egyptian barges, one armoured and one mechanized (Paratroop) brigade crossed the canal on the morning of 16 October. it was at this point that the Israelis suffered from significant disunity of command. Perhaps overcome with victory, brigade commanders on the west bank began to move towards Cairo. To do so would have been operational folly in that Israeli resupply lines would have been non-existent. 

The Yom Kippur War demonstrated that even a technologically superior military can be vulnerable if it underestimates its adversaries.  Defense Minister Moshe Dayan remarked:

The total balance of forces is in our favour, and outweighs all other Arab considerations and motives, and puts a break on the immediate renewal of hostilities… Our military superiority is the double result of Arab weakness and our own strength. Their weakness derives from factors, which, I believe, will not quickly change. (Jerusalem Post, AUG 73).

Yom Kippur War: Critical Aspects


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Ignoring intelligence information

Among the many aftershocks of this fateful clash, the hardest for Israel to digest was Syria and Egypt’s successful strategic and tactical deception, and the failure of the Israeli intelligence community (IC) to provide the necessary warning, despite having sufficient intelligence indicators.

Throughout September, Israel received eleven warnings of war from well-placed sources. However, Mossad Director-General Zvi Zamir continued to insist that war was not an Arab option, even after King Hussein’s warning (On Sept. 25th). This warning too was ignored. Just hours before the attack began, orders went out for a partial call-up of the Israeli reserves.

One of the most significant lessons from the Yom Kippur War was the importance of accurate and timely intelligence. Israel, despite its reputation for having a strong intelligence apparatus, was caught off guard by the surprise attack launched by Egypt and Syria. This failure highlighted the need for continuous and rigorous intelligence assessments.

IDF chiefs and the intelligence services – with the exception of a few mid-rank officers – interpreted the thread as part of an exercise and were convinced that the Egyptians did not intend to launch an attack. The Israeli top brass had feared that the information could cause unnecessary tension on the military and home fronts.

Israeli military intelligence leaders, including Eli Zeira, due to the May false alarm, refused to accept the evidence of numerous warnings and indicators that the Arabs planned to attack As a result, Israel was largely unprepared for a two-front strategic offensive.

Political aspects

On the evening of September 25, 1973, the guesthouse of Mossad  just north of Tel Aviv  had a very special visitor: His Majesty King Hussein of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, a country Israel was at war with, at least officially. With him was his prime minister, Zaid Rifai, and his intelligence chief, General Fathi Abu Talib. The king was coming from an earlier summit meeting in Cairo held between the 10th and 12th of September—it also was an extraordinary meeting. President Anwar Sadat of Egypt was the host and President Hafez al-Assad of Syria was the other guest. 

King’s host in Israel was the Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir with Israeli officials from IDF and intelligence. The earliest accounts of the meeting in Israeli newspapers—in 1993, 20 years after the meeting—claimed the king brought an explicit warning that Syria and Egypt were about to attack Israel, a warning that the prime minister failed to heed, leading to the surprise attack on Israel on October 6, 1973. 

The King was providing strategic warning based on extraordinary access. He was also turning Israel’s strategic thinking on its head: Israel was focused on Egypt as the main threat because it was a larger country with a more competent military; Hussein was saying that Israel’s immediate danger will be Syria, which is ready for war and much closer to Israel’s homeland.  This warning was ignored, and Israeli intelligence indicated that the king had not told anything that was not already known.

The day before the war broke out then-Mossad chief Zvi Zamir unexpectedly landed in the British capital. He had been summoned to a meeting with the “Angel,” the alias of Ashraf Marwan, Nasser’s son-in-law, who was among Sadat’s closest advisers, and a Mossad agent. Just 14 hours before the outbreak of the attacks in Sinai and the Golan Heights, Marwan delivered the most important news about H-hour and the coordination of the attack by Egyptian president Anwar Sadat and Syrian ruler Hafez al-Assad. 

Golda Meir was presented with the option to order a preemptive strike. Meir declined, however, telling IDF Chief of Staff Gen. David Elazar that “there is always the possibility that we will need help, and if we strike first we will get nothing from anyone.”

Mobilisation of reserve forces brought additional complications. Premature mobilisation could be interpreted as a sort of a “proxy first blow” by the enemy. As it has been noted, a first strike by the Israelis would be seen as self-defeating in the long run, and was to be avoided at all costs. Only later, in the middle of the Yom Kippur fast, did the mobilisation of the reserve forces begin.

Golda Meir was however right.  The first reports to White House were vague. It was said that the Israelis must have attacked because nobody believed that the Egyptians were capable of launching an attack across the Suez Canal. When the war began Henry Kissinger said: ‘The one thing that is not happening is that the Israelis would attack on Yom Kippur. That is practically – almost – impossible.”  

During the night of October 8–9, an alarmed Dayan told Meir that “this is the end of the third temple.”  He was warning of Israel’s impending total defeat, but “Temple” was also the code word for Israel’s nuclear weapons.  Dayan raised the nuclear topic in a cabinet meeting, warning that the country was approaching a point of “last resort”.  That night, Meir authorized the assembly of thirteen 20-kiloton-of-TNT (84 TJ) tactical nuclear weapons for Jericho missiles at Sdot Micha Airbase and F-4 Phantom II aircraft at Tel Nof Airbase.  They would be used if absolutely necessary to prevent total defeat, but the preparation was done in an easily detectable way, likely as a signal to the United States.  Kissinger learned of the nuclear alert on the morning of October 9. That day, President Nixon ordered the commencement of Operation Nickel Grass, an American airlift to replace all of Israel’s material losses.So in couple of days from the start of the Yom Kippur war the U.S. started to provide significant military aid to Israel. Kissinger told Sadat that the reason for the U.S. airlift was that the Israelis were close to “going nuclear”.

European countries refused to allow U.S. airplanes carrying supplies for Israel to refuel at their bases, fearing an Arab oil embargo, with the exception of Portugal and the Netherlands. Israel began receiving supplies via U.S. Air Force cargo airplanes on October 14. United States shipped 22,395 tons of matériel to Israel. 8,755 tons of it arrived before the end of the war. American C-141 Starlifter and C-5 Galaxy aircraft flew 567 missions throughout the airlift. El Al planes flew in an additional 5,500 tons of matériel in 170 flights. United States delivered approximately 90,000 tons of materiel to Israel by sealift by the beginning of December, using 16 ships. 33,210 tons of it arrived by November.

Starting on October 9, the Soviet Union began supplying Egypt and Syria by air and by sea. The Soviets airlifted 12,500–15,000 tons of supplies, of which 6,000 tons went to Egypt, 3,750 tons went to Syria and 575 tons went to Iraq.The Soviets supplied another 63,000 tons, mainly to Syria, by means of a sealift by October 30.

Militarily, Israel had the upper hand. But the outcome of war is measured in political, not military terms. By this criterion, the 1973 war was an Egyptian success.

The war demonstrated the need for diplomacy and conflict resolution efforts in the Middle East. The conflict led to negotiations and agreements such as the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt, which ultimately led to the return of the Sinai Peninsula to Egyptian control. This emphasised the importance of peaceful negotiations in the region.

The Yom Kippur war in brief

“The Egyptian army and the Syrian army are about to launch an attack on Israel on Saturday 6.10.73 in the early evening.”(Zvi Zamir, the head of the Mossad, early morning Saturday 6.10.73)

The war began with a coordinated surprise attack by Egypt and Syria on Israel’s holiest day, Yom Kippur (the Day of Atonement), when many Israelis were observing the holiday and caught off guard. Egyptian and Syrian forces launched simultaneous attacks in the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights, respectively.

The situation was so severe that in the morning of October 7 Moshe Dayan called Shalhevet Freier, the director-general of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission, to a meeting with Golda Meir to discuss the possible arming of nuclear weapons. Meir rejected this option.

Yom Kippur War: Critical Aspects

In the first 24 hours, the Egyptian army overwhelmed the thinly manned Israeli positions and occupied a 15-kilometre-(some 9 miles)-wide strip of land on the canal’s eastern bank. The Egyptians managed to breach the Bar-Lev line and infiltrate more than 100,000 soldiers, approximately 400 tanks, and commando units into Sinai, and build several bridges over the canal. An attempted Israeli counterattack on October 8 failed with  heavy IDF casualties. Only after the IDF crossed the canal on October 16 did it seize the initiative, encircling the Egyptian Third Army and advancing to 101 kilometres (nearly 63 miles) from Cairo.  

Yom Kippur War: Critical Aspects

The war changed course after Israeli forces crossed the Suez Canal on October 16. From that point on, the Egyptian army was in retreat, and was saved from total defeat only by the ceasefire declared by the UN Security Council in resolutions adopted on October 22, 23, and 25.

The Syrian army swept into the southern part of the Golan, nearly reaching the Sea of Galilee.  Unable to mobilise in time, Israeli forces in the Northern and Southern Commands were left to battle armies at great numerical disadvantage. In the north, the ratio of Syrian tanks to Israel was as much as 50:1 in some battles. When Israeli reserves arrived the enemy was pushed back by an Israeli counterattack. By the war’s end, the IDF seized Syrian territory on the northern part of the front, reaching as far as 40 kilometres (about 25 miles) from Damascus.

Yom Kippur War: Critical Aspects

Casualties according Wikipedia were following:

Israel suffered between 2,521 and 2,800 killed in action. An additional 7,250 to 8,800 soldiers were wounded. Some 293 Israelis were captured. Approximately 400 Israeli tanks were destroyed. Another 600 were disabled but returned to service after repairs. A major Israeli advantage, noted by many observers, was their ability to quickly return damaged tanks to combat. The Israeli Air Force lost 102 airplanes.

Arab casualties were known to be much higher than Israel’s. Precise figures are difficult to ascertain as Egypt and Syria never disclosed official figures. The lowest casualty estimate is 8,000 (5,000 Egyptian and 3,000 Syrian) killed and 18,000 wounded. The highest estimate is 18,500 (15,000 Egyptian and 3,500 Syrian) killed. Iraq lost 278 killed and 898 wounded, while Jordan suffered 23 killed and 77 wounded. Some 8,372 Egyptians, 392 Syrians, 13 Iraqis and 6 Moroccans were taken prisoner. 

Arab tank losses amounted to 2,250- 2,300. 400 of these fell into Israeli hands in good working order and were incorporated into Israeli service. Between 341 and 514 Arab aircraft were shot down. Nineteen Arab naval vessels, including 10 missile boats, were sunk for no Israeli losses

Some Scattered comments

The Yom Kippur War saw the use of advanced military strategies and tactics by both sides. Egypt and Syria used anti-tank missiles effectively, while Israel employed innovative military tactics and rapidly mobilised its reserve forces. The war was Israeli military victory but both – Egypt and Israel got political gains.

The war prompted both Israel and its Arab neighbours to reassess their military strategies and defence capabilities. It also highlighted the importance of intelligence and early warning systems.

The Yom Kippur War underscored the necessity of maintaining a high level of military readiness, even during periods of relative peace. Both Israel and the Arab states learned that complacency and reductions in defence spending and preparedness can be costly in terms of lives and territory.

The Yom Kippur War had a profound psychological impact on Israel, as it shattered the perception of invincibility that had developed after the 1967 Six-Day War. This psychological trauma led to a national soul-searching and a reevaluation of Israel’s security policies.

In summary, the Yom Kippur War was a pivotal moment in the history of the Middle East, with far-reaching consequences for the region’s geopolitics and diplomacy. It demonstrated the complexity of the Arab-Israeli conflict and the involvement of global superpowers in regional conflicts.

Israel can teach us that we must never hold all truths from past battles as unchanging principals upon which to plan future wars.


A protest against the Israeli government started four months after the war ended.  Shimon Agranat, President of the Israeli Supreme Court, was asked to lead an inquiry, the Agranat Commission, into the events leading up to the war and the setbacks of the first few days.

The Agranat Commission published its preliminary findings on April 2, 1974. Six people were held particularly responsible for Israel’s failings:

  • Though his performance and conduct during the war was lauded, IDF Chief of Staff David Elazar was recommended for dismissal after the Commission found he bore “personal responsibility for the assessment of the situation and the preparedness of the IDF”.
  • Military Intelligence (Aman) Chief, Aluf Eli Zeira, and his deputy, head of Research, Brigadier-General Aryeh Shalev, were recommended for dismissal.
  • Lt. Colonel Bandman, head of the Aman desk for Egypt, and Lt. Colonel Gedelia, chief of intelligence for the Southern Command, were recommended for transfer away from intelligence duties.
  • Shmuel Gonen, commander of the Southern front, was recommended by the initial report to be relieved of active duty. 

In addition public calls for Meir’s and especially Dayan’s resignations intensified. In the December 1973 legislative election, Meir’s Alignment party lost five Knesset seats. On April 11, 1974, Golda Meir resigned. Her cabinet followed suit, including Dayan, who had previously offered to resign twice and was turned down both times by Meir. 

In 1999, the issue was revisited by the Israeli political leadership to prevent similar shortcomings from being repeated. The Israeli National Security Council was created to improve coordination between the different security and intelligence bodies, and the political branch of government.

Sources e.g: The Modern War Institute ,The Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC®) , The Brookings Institution , Wikipedia , Israel State Archives


The fateful telegram from Mossad Chief Zvi Zamir

Yom Kippur War: Critical Aspects

The first page of the telegram sent by Freddy Einy of the Mossad to Golda Meir’s military secretary, Yisrael Lior. ISA, File A 7047/7.

For a translation of the telegram, see below:

Top Secret – Personal

Information from the meeting on 5.10.73.

  1. The Egyptian army and the Syrian army are about to launch an attack on Israel on Saturday, October 6, towards evening.
  2. The attack will open simultaneously on the Suez front and on the Golan front.
  3. During the past week, two divisions from the Cairo area were transferred to the front, thus virtually all of the Egyptian army is now stationed in the Canal Zone. In the Cairo area there remain one armored brigade (in the Hikestep, a large military encampment), a brigade of the Republican Guard and four infantry brigades. Most of the armored and artillery forces are at the front.
  4. On September 25, Sadat took the decision to start the war on October 6, but did not tell anyone about the date. According to the source, this date was chosen because it is a “holiday” for us – and despite the fast of Ramadan. On September 29, the president convened the National Security Council (Majlis al-Aman al-Koumi) and informed the council members of his decision to break the cease-fire soon, explaining that it was now the most appropriate time for it politically. He did not give the council the date. On September 30, Sadat convened the Supreme War Council (Majlis al-Harb al-‘Ala) and told its members similar things, without giving a date. On October 2, Sadat told the war minister, Ahmed Ismail, of the date, and ordered him to invite and inform the representatives of the Syrian General Staff. On the same day, Ahmed Ismail met in Cairo with the Syrian officers who arrived from Damascus and he flew to Damascus the next day, on Wednesday, 3.10 in order to continue discussions and arrangements.
  5. Sadat moved to the Al-Tahera Palace, where he established his headquarters. He ordered his aides to move to “emergency offices.” Hafez Ismail then moved to the ‘Abd al-Na’im palace near Al-Tahera palace, and two of the vice presidents moved to the Kaba palace.
  6. The Egyptian attack will begin with an artillery bombardment and an air force attack on targets in Sinai. After that the Canal will be crossed. For the purpose of the crossing, five or six bridges will be built, of which 3 will be used for the crossing opposite the line of the passes. The other bridges would be used as diversions. Parts of the bridges were recently transferred on 150 trucks via the “State of Nasser” road. After the crossing, an effort will be made to capture territory to a depth of about 10 kilometers, and at the first stage it is not intended to reach the line of the passes. When the army arrives at the depth determined, it will try to hold out and the results of this stage will determine the sequel. The crossing will receive intensive aerial defense from surface / air missiles, mainly SAM 2, 3 and 6, and Tsalka [probably the ZSU-23-4 “Shilka”-  a  Soviet self-propelled, radar guided, anti-aircraft, missile with 4 23 mm autocannons], and 30 North Korean pilots will participate in defending Egypt’s skies. The Mirage and Hunter planes will participate in battles in the Sinai, Sharm El Sheikh will be bombed by the T-16 [TU-16] in an attempt to destroy and destroy the structures that were built there. Then, commando units will be deployed to try and conquer the place.
  7. The Syrian army, which is almost entirely stationed on the front line, will simultaneously attack the Egyptians and try to conquer the Golan or part of it. The Syrian air force will attack three air force bases, one of which will be Ramat David. Thirty Sukhoi, 20 Syrian and MiG 12 (F-21) fighter planes will attack. They will try to hit the runways. The coordination between the Syrian army and the Egyptian army will be carried out by a number of Egyptian officers who are attached to the Syrian General Staff. They will also report on the beginning of the Syrian attack. The source, personally, is still skeptical that the Syrians will attack on time, but the general view is that Assad will indeed “go with the Egyptians,” as this is his only chance to recapture the Golan Heights. President Sadat does not make his actions conditional on those of the Syrians.
  8.  According to the plan, some of the Egyptian navy vessels were to leave Egyptian ports and move to Tobruk, 36 hours before the attack began. This was carried out and several  Egyptian destroyers and other vessels have already arrived in Tobruk.
  9. Also according to the plan, the Egyptian Airlines planes destined for Cairo were flown to Libya. This was supposed to take place 24 hours before the attack was launched. It was carried out, and the Egyptian airplanes which were about to leave London and Munich for Cairo, left on 5.10 empty and flew to Benghazi. The passengers remained in London and Munich. It was explained to them that the planes had been transferred to flights from Tripoli, and instead on Saturday other planes would be chartered to take them to Cairo on Saturday. A DC-9 plane is about to leave England at 1700 (from Gatwick airport). On Saturday an Egyptian Airlines plane will not fly to London. The source said that he does not understand what will happen to the other Egyptian Airlines planes due to arrive in Cairo on Saturday.
  10. The transfer of Egyptian Air Force vessels to Tobruk and diversion of the Egyptian Airlines planes to Benghazi were arranged by Ashraf Marwan, who went to Libya for this purpose on Wednesday 3 10.
  11. According to the source, the Egyptians were surprised at what they saw as Israel’s lack of response to Egyptian preparations for Egyptian war. In their opinion, this can be explained by one of two explanations: A.That the Israelis are self-confident, watching events and ready to destroy the Egyptian army if it attacks. B.That the Israelis do not know exactly what is going on and do not understand the severity of the situation.
  12. The new medium-range ground / ground missiles are not operational yet and will not be used in an attack.
  13. 12 Egyptian fighter pilots were recently sent to the Soviet Union for a course on the MiG 23, and are now training on this aircraft. They will not be returned to Egypt before the war. The commander of the Egyptian air force asked for it, but the president refused. They will not call back Egyptian officers who are studying abroad.
  14. The source estimates there are “99 percent chances” that the attack will open on October 6. One percent he leaves to himself saying that the president can still change his mind even when his “finger is on the button.” According to the source, Sadat thinks he can surprise us. In the opinion of the source, this time the president has gone too far on the war.
  15. The Soviet response – the Soviets noticed the preparations being made for the start of the war. The Soviet ambassador went to Heikal to try to find out what was going to happen.  Heikal told Sadat about this and Sadat invited the Soviet ambassador and told him about his intentions without giving a date. Originally he did not know about the Soviet planes that arrived in Cairo on 5.10 in the morning. Until recently, the Soviets have made it clear to the Egyptians that they were not interested in war in the near future. They may press the Egyptians not to fight, but in the opinion of the source, the president will be able to withstand this pressure.
  16. To the question of the logic behind starting a war now, the source replied that this makes no sense. To the remark that starting a war now would harm Egypt’s recent political achievements and the chances of reaching an understanding with Kissinger, the source replied that there were no hopes in Egypt for any achievement from political contacts.
  17. According to the source, there is no intention to expand the Egyptian air force attacks beyond Sinai, but if our air force attacks deep in Egypt, the Egyptian air force will operate T 61 [ TU-16} aircraft carrying air-to-surface missiles that will attack Tel Aviv, coming from the sea, at low altitude, and after the attack will try to get to Benghazi airport (Benina), land there, re-equip and go back to the attack. This field is protected by an Algerian MiG-21 squadron and a 100 mm. anti-aircraft brigade.
  18. In response to the questions, the source replied that this is not a “political trick” and that the intention is really to go to war.
  19. The source agreed to the remark that a war in the Middle East could endanger the understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union and cause a setback for Egypt’s position.
  20. The source expressed his opinion that we know very well about the preparations for the war by Egypt and Syria, but pretend that we do not know about it and even denied that there were Egyptian and Syrian army movements in the direction of the front. According to the source, the Egyptians estimate that in the event of a war, we will try to capture Port Said, to land commando units in Jabal Ahmar in Cairo, capturing Air Force headquarters and air defenses, and deploying commando units in the Red Sea area.
  21. After mentioning to the source about a previous report that a war might develop from a large Egyptian military exercise, the source said that this is indeed the case in the case before us.
  22. According to the source, there is no intention of landing an Egyptian army from the sea, and there is no intention of transferring Egyptian military units to Syria.
  23. The source said that recently, equipment for modern electronic warfare had not arrived in Egypt.
  24. The Jordanians will not participate in the war.
  25. The Libyans learned of the war only two days ago.
  26. The source mentioned that the Egyptian Air Force has about 100 usable helicopters of various types.

This article first appeared in Conflicts by Ariel Rusila blog.

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