“God is great, death to America. Death to Israel, curse on the Jews, victory to Islam.” (Houthi slogan)
Unlike other Iranian proxy armies (primarily Hezbollah and Hamas), which directly threaten Israel, the Houthis have already significantly damaged international shipping, forcing cargo ships to seek alternative routes to avoid the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and the Suez Canal. Similarly, the port of Eilat in southern Israel is practically closed and Egypt’s economy has been badly damaged. In December 2024, Israelis were constantly having to take cover at night due to ballistic and cruise missiles and drones launched from Yemen. There is great pressure in Israel to resolve the threat posed by the Houthis, and the political leadership and the military have several solutions to this.
In December 2014, Houthi leader Abdul-Malik al-Houthi announced that he had fired 1,147 ballistic missiles, cruise missiles or drones in the past 14 months. Israel says about 400 of these were aimed at Israel (most of which were successfully intercepted), while the rest were aimed at international ships.
The Houthis as a Military Threat
The Houthis’ military threat is based – due to their location – mainly on ballistic and cruise missiles and drones. The Houthis also have a significant ground force – estimated at up to 200,000 fighters – equipped with small arms, grenade and rocket launchers and light artillery. The ground force and short-range missiles and drones are not a threat to Israel but rather to the Houthis’ local opponents, particularly Saudi Arabia.
The Houthis have used a variety of short-range ballistic missiles, including Scud derivatives and locally modified versions with ranges of over 500 km. The most significant of these are medium- and long-range missiles, mainly of Iranian origin, such as the Burkan-2H, an Iranian-modified Scud missile with an estimated range of 800–1,000 km, or the Toufan – a surface-to-surface missile with a range of 1,800 km,
Cruise missiles – such as the Hoveyzeh – can reach over 1,300 km with precise guidance, as can the Quds-2 missile. Drones (UAVs) and so-called cruise missiles have a range of over 1,800 km, and the Shahed 136 model has a range of up to 2,500 km. In addition to reconnaissance drones, the Houthis also have kamikaze drones that can reach well into Israel in one-way attacks.
Naval drones, which are unmanned surface vessels (USVs) loaded with explosives, have been used against the cargo fleet, and in addition to these, the Houthis have laid mines in the Red Sea. In the past, before armed convoys, the Houthis also seized merchant ships with helicopter attacks.
The Houthis have demonstrated a capability for more sophisticated cyber and information warfare, utilizing social media and regional media outlets: In other respects, Yemen’s rugged terrain offers a natural advantage for guerrilla tactics and defense. The Houthis have formed alliances with tribes and maintain support in their support areas, such as Saada and northern Yemen.: The Houthis lack advanced air and heavy armor forces and a modern logistics network. However, their limitations in conventional warfare and their dependence on Iranian support create vulnerabilities that regional actors can exploit.
Iran provides weapons, training, and technical expertise through the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and allied networks. Weapons and equipment are smuggled through Oman, Djibouti, and the Red Sea, often evading the blockades of the Saudi-led coalition.
Israel shifts from defense to attack
The Houthis have launched around 400 missile and drone attacks on Israel during the Gaza war, in addition to terrorist attacks in the maritime areas. Israel, either alone or in collaboration with others, has focused on repelling – with good success – attacks directly targeting Israel.
The interception has not always been successful and some missiles have penetrated and in addition, parts and fragments of the intercepted missiles have fallen to the ground, causing damage. For example, on December 19, 2024, the Arrow air defense system intercepted a missile fired from Yemen before it entered Israeli airspace. Nevertheless, the missile’s warhead hit a school in Ramat Gan, causing extensive damage. No casualties were reported. Similarly, on December 21, 2024, the Houthis struck the Tel Aviv area with a Palestine 2 supersonic ballistic missile, the missile was intercepted several times, but the attempts failed and it hit a playground in southern Tel Aviv, wounding 16 people and causing significant damage.
On December 19, 2024, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) made a significant shift from a purely defensive approach to a proactive defense, striking Houthi terrorist targets in several locations in Yemen for the third time since October 7, 2023, with dozens of combat, refueling, and reconnaissance aircraft. The IAF carried out precision strikes on its targets in Yemen, more than 1,060 miles from Israel. According to the IAF, the strike targeted facilities used by the Houthis for military and terrorist activities.
The first wave of strikes hit military targets in the Houthi-controlled ports of Al-Hudaydah, As-Salif, and Ras Isa. These ports are the terrorist regime’s financial hubs and important bases for arms smuggling from Iran. The second wave targeted power plants and military targets in Sanaa. The operations were carried out by 14 IAF fighter jets, all of which returned safely; Nine Houthis were killed and several injured in the attacks.
US Central Command (CENTCOM) forces also struck Houthi targets in Yemen: on 16–17 December 2024, precision strikes targeted a major command and control center in Sanaa, and on 21 December 2024, precision strikes targeted a missile storage facility and a command and control facility in Sanaa. These strikes differ from previous ones, which mainly targeted radar systems and attack systems (launchers, missiles and UAVs) near the Yemeni coast.
The problem with Israel’s follow-up actions
There is great pressure in Israel to eliminate the Houthi threat; in December 2024, almost nightly air raids have kept the population awake, especially in the Tel Aviv area. Although the rate of attacks being repelled is high, several injuries have occurred simply because people have rushed to shelters. As Israel considers further action against the Houthis, at least the following factors are likely to influence the outcome:
- The distance to Yemen (nearly 2,000 km) is a significant challenge for Israel, and air operations require intermediate refueling, coordination, and other support in a complex environment; for example, the United States shot down its own aircraft in its December operation.
- Unlike its other war fronts, Israeli intelligence services do not have a similarly extensive target bank, and it is more difficult to track and locate Houthi leaders as potential targets for precision strikes.
- Israel has not only the challenge but also the opportunity to increase its military coordination – in addition to the United States – with regional allies such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the Gulf states, which are also threatened by the Houthis and Iran.
My conclusion: Israel’s options for countering and eliminating the Houthi threat
Israel has several options for countering and eliminating the Houthi threat, and in my opinion the most important ones, from least effective to most effective, are the following four:
- Option 0, i.e. focusing on countering missiles coming from Yemen, alone or together with the US or its allies. I believe that pressure from Israeli civilians will force more effective solutions if the missile strikes continue as they did on December 24.
- In addition to countering, Israel, alone or with the support of others, can carry out airstrikes on December 16-21, 2024, on Houthi ports, command centers, weapons depots, and, as intelligence increases, on other Houthi infrastructure in the region, as well as on the movement’s leaders.
- Cutting off Iran’s supply lines to Yemen: The economy of northern Yemen is now built entirely on Iran, from which all weapons and most of the know-how also come. Blocking Iran’s shipping lanes may well be the ideal course of action. In addition to destroying ports, Israel can sink ships traveling from Iran anywhere along their route. Israel can use its navy to cut off the supply lines, but American and British support would be crucial. This scenario is likely to be supported in part by the United States and Britain, who have launched a joint naval and air strike against the Houthis in response to their ongoing attacks on shipping, with Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Denmark, the Netherlands and New Zealand providing non-operational support.
- Destroying Iran’s economy and nuclear program as part of a direct Israeli or US-backed solution, leaving the Houthis on the sidelines but “cared for” alongside this broader solution. At its most extensive, the destruction of Iran’s underground nuclear program capacity would likely require the use of tactical nuclear weapons with an extremely high threshold for use; however, the option has been planned for almost ten years, so the speed of implementation is good because the risks, weaknesses and opportunities are well known. The option would come into consideration during the new US administration if a diplomatic solution is not reached regarding the nuclear program or when Iran’s nuclear warhead is estimated to be ready.
The various options can be supplemented with humanitarian elements, i.e. sending food and medical supplies to the residents of northern Yemen to increase the pressure of the population against the Houthi regime; this could also be a good long-term strategy.
I believe that a continuous planned campaign is needed and not just a single operation like the December 24 attack. Israel’s recent attacks on Yemen were effective, but in order to neutralize the Houthis in the long term, Iran’s supply line to Yemen must be closed. The upcoming campaign will require different operational capabilities and a different level of organization, given the logistical challenges. In addition to the air force, the campaign will emphasize the role of the navy and intelligence, while before the December attacks the main role was played by missile defense.
Sources and background include BICOM , BICOM , JerusalemPost , The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center
The article first appeared in the Finnish online publication Ariel-Israelista Suomeksi
