One State? Two States? What's the Real Issue?

Sar Shalom
Among pundits, the mark of Seriousness is to push for a two-state solution to the conflict between Israel and the Arabs of the disputed territories. According to this Serious position, one-state means either that the Palestinians remain a subjugated people, if that state is Jewish, or that Jewish sovereignty comes to an end, if that state is Arab. The problem with this line of thought is that it confuses objectives with means.
The acknowledged objective of the two-state advocates is that all residents of the southwestern Levant should have a bona fide say in the governance of the state that rules them and that Israel's future as a Jewish state must not be endangered. Israeli annexation of the disputed territories and extending the vote to the Arab residents there would secure the first objective. However, between the Arabs and the post-Zionist Jews, Israel would then cease to have a Zionist majority, which would jeopardize Israel's continuation as a Jewish state. Thus, giving the Arabs of the disputed territories a voice in the governance of their state without threatening Israel's Jewish character requires putting their homes under the jurisdiction of one or more different states, or creating one or more new states to assume that sovereignty.
If this was all that the two-state advocates want, there would be no problem. However, these advocates invariably add two provisions to this. One is that one new state should encompass all the Arabs of the disputed territories. The second is that the territory to be ceded to this new state should not be based on what is needed to function as a state or to provide services for its citizens, but that is should be based on what Jordan conquered in 1949.
In calling for Israel to withdraw from the disputed territories, the usual foundation is United Nation Security Council Resolution 242. However, relying on 242 to call for complete, or cosmetically different from complete, withdraw has a few problems. One is that the language in the resolution is ambiguous and that language that would have clearly meant complete withdraw was considered and rejected. Another problem is that basing the final borders on the previous demarcation lines runs afoul of two provisions in 242. The second introductory clause of 242 states:

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war...

and action clause 1(ii) calls for:

Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and ... [the] right [of every State] to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries

While the most recent change in control over the disputed territories was the result of an Israeli "acquisition" by war, the prior demarcation lines were also the result of an earlier acquisition by war. Anyone saying that the territory's having been possessed by Jordan prior to the 1967 war confers a right to any party is effectively conferring their blessing on Jordan's conquest in 1949. Either you believe that acquiring territory through war is inadmissible or you do not, there is no saying that acquisitions by some parties is admissible and is not for other parties.
Furthermore, Abbas has given no indication that he is ready to terminate all claims. In effect, unilaterally imposing would be allowing him to benefit from 242 without accepting its obligations.
What we should do is thus: shift the discussion from the means to the ends. Instead of talking about what states should ultimately exist and in possession of what territory, talk about the need for everyone to have a say in how they are governed, provided that some party could assume power among the Arabs of the disputed territories that has conditions short of Israel committing national suicide to end all claims against Israel, but that no past war should prejudice the division of land among its inhabitants.