Earlier this April, British Foreign Secretary David Cameron visited the United States to talk further military aid to Ukraine with his counterpart Secretary of State Antony Blinken. But Trump loyalists in the Republican Party objected to the plan. Cameron needed to remove the bottleneck to pass the Ukrainian aid bill in the US House of Representatives, because Russia was pushing back Ukrainian counteroffensive and an increasing number of civilians were killed. Therefore, he proposed to meet the supposed Republican presidential nominee Donald Trump and House Speaker Mike Johnson urgently. Cameron's diplomatic tour was in parallel with Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida's state visit to meet President Joe Biden. The latter drew much more attention from the media and think tanks around the world, but I regard Cameron's direct endeavor more important to move America that does not act as the superpower. Let me explain it below.
Both British and Japanese diplomatic efforts were commonly aimed at getting America more engaged with the world. Along with the peril of Trump 2.0, the rise of anti-Israeli "Hamas left" on the left raise serious concerns with populist isolationism in America. Can foreign leader overturn such trends? In history, Winston Churchill urged the hesitant superpower to actively involved in stopping Nazi Germany. Also, when Americans were indulged in a daydream of postwar peace, he gave the Iron Curtain speech to awaken them to see the reality of international politics. Shortly after that, the United States declared the Truman Doctrine. When the Congress was bitterly divided between internationalists and nativists, America hosted leaders from key allies of the Atlantic and the Pacific. Compared the two, Ukraine aid that Cameron brought was emergent, and there were no scenarios arranged by the foreign service beforehand when he met his opponent Trump. Meanwhile, Kishida was warmly welcomed as the state guest by President Joe Biden and both houses of the Congress. More importantly, Britain is directly involved in military aid for Ukraine to defeat Russia.
On the other hand, Japan is still constrained by the pacifist constitution, which keeps this country from participating in "the job so fun as to shoot down bad guys". This quotation is a well-known phrase by USMC Lieutenant General James Mattis, who was later appointed to the Secretary of Defense, when he talked about his own mission in Iraq and Afghanistan ( General: It's 'fun to shoot some people'; CNN; February 4, 2005). After all, it is a serious drawback for Japan to be a vital stakeholder in global security, as long as it is unable to get involved in military aspects. Kishida spoke softly at the congressional speech, as if healing the superpower in fatigue of global tottering rather than reconfirming America's role as the indispensable nation for the world order ( "Japanese PM Fumio Kishida addresses U.S. 'self-doubt' about world role in remarks to Congress"; NBC News; April 11, 2024). That does not necessarily come from his unprovocative personality. Even more exuberant Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, who expressed strong support the Iraq War by the Bush administration ( "Press Conference by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi on the Issue of Iraq"; Prime Minister's Office, Japan; March 20, 2003), did not actually send combat troops. Japanese commitment was too small to worry about being caught up in America's war. Whether "healing" Kishida or "exuberant" Koizumi, Japanese leaders fall short of fulfilling the Churchillian role.
Nevertheless, since no single politician today is so charismatic as Churchill was, it is quite likely that an indirect Anglo-Japanese diplomatic coordination had some effect to prompt the both parties to reach an agreement. Kishida's Japan was a good side kicker. The aid bill was finally approved on this occasion, but quite uncertain for future. Russian President Vladimir Putin clings to reconquering Ukraine so much that the war is going to continue long. Unlike Cameron's official meeting with Secretary Blinken, the detail of his closed-door meeting with Trump has not been publicized. He did not even mention that on Twitter, while tweeting extensively about the Israeli-Hamas war. Trump may have been reluctant to listen to Cameron, but he had to avoid negative reputation of delaying the Ukraine aid bill to pass the Congress, in view of his presidential campaign. In addition, Britain's commitment to military aid made Cameron's case more compelling, because Trump is obsessed with burden sharing of defense spending. That was also helpful in his meeting with Blinken to reconfirm further assistance to Ukraine by Britain and the United States. International politics is inherently leontomorphic, and therefore, strong defense and deep military commitment are essential in law enforcement for the world order.
Now, let me talk about the bottleneck for successful Cameron-Blinken foreign ministers meeting, which is Trump's view of the world. Hal Brand of the American Enterprise Institute comments that it is simplistic to take his America First as complete disengagement from the world. Rather, it is extremely sensitive to the costs and benefits of intervention. Therefore, Trump is skeptical of helping Ukraine, and he believes that America not run the risk of getting involved in a big war for the sake of defending small countries overseas, whether in Europe or Asia. But there isn't an Indo-Pacific exception in Trump's mindsets despite China hawk remarks by him and his fellows. While showing isolationist aspects, Trump is willing to intervene abroad to impose national interests of his understanding on others. Meanwhile, he sidelines the idea that America as guarantor of the liberal world order disdainfully. That lead to trade war with China, and brinkmanship diplomacy against Iran and North Korea in his last term. Based on such viewpoints, Trump fellows pursue military build-up, but not interested in defending allies or invaded countries. Rather, they focus on homeland defense, and explore more investment in cyber security and missile defense. They assume international politics as rivalries of self-interested nation states, and thus, agendas like democracy promotion is useless for them ( "An "America First" World: What Trump's Return Might Mean for Global Order"; Foreign Affairs; May 27, 2024).
Of course, there is a fallacy in such viewpoints, which leads to Trump's poor understanding of the alliance. Former US ambassador to NATO Ivo Daalder criticizes that Trump sees the trans-Atlantic alliance as a liability that could drag America into a war against nuclear Russia when some eastern flank nation is invaded. Actually, the alliance deters enemy aggression. Furthermore, he is wrongly preoccupied with burden sharing of defense spending, instead of pursuing common security objectives with partners ( "NATO is about security - not dollars and cents"; Politico; April 10, 2024). His six-month blocking of the Ukraine aid bill through his Republican loyalists in the House had benefitted Russia so much, which hurt mutual trust between Europe and America ( The US aid package to Ukraine will help. But a better strategy is urgently needed"; Chatham House; 26 April, 2024). As long as American right wingers are entrapped in a "Hillbilly Elegy" victimhood mindset, i.e., allies freeride the security umbrella, another congressional bickering could delay necessary help for Ukraine.
An overview of Britain's trans-Atlantic diplomacy is the following. Meanwhile, regardless of the reelection possibility of Trump, strong Lindbergh isolationism among the American public poses constraints on UK foreign policy. Wyn Rees of the Royal United Services Institute presents an over view of Britain's relations with NATO and the United States. Britain has been America's first choice for the partner in military and intelligence operations, which is so beneficial to its political presence NATO and worldwide. Trump's anti-NATO and anti-Ukrainian posture ruins this premise. Therefore, Cameron had to show European commitment to burden sharing to Trump, such as defense spending increase, intra-European defense cooperation, troop deployment in the Baltic, and so forth ( "Trump, NATO and Anglo-American Relations"; RUSI; 9 May, 2024). As of February 29, this year, before the Ukraine Aid bill passed the US Congress, EU institutions donated more aid than the United States. In addition, sovereign European countries made contributions. That is to say, America, not Europe, was freeriding the alliance, unless the Ukraine Aid bill passed. See the chart.
Chart
https://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-us-aid-going-ukraine#chapter-title-0-5
For a Churchillian diplomacy to overturn isolationism in America, Britain needs to strengthen its own political and military resilience on the European side against Russia. Currently, Ukraine has signed a bilateral security agreement with France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and Britain. For effective coordination of these deals, how much can the United Kingdom take initiatives in a European framework to support Ukraine without EU membership? Britain took leadership role of the drone coalition in the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, which was founded by NATO to facilitate arms procurement for Ukraine. Also, Samir Puri of Chatham House urges the United Kingdom to support EU proposed joint military procurement initiatives, such as the EU-Ukraine Defence Industries Forum (European Commission; 6 May, 2024) and the European Defense Industrial Strategy (EDIS) ( European Commission; 5 March, 2024), to improve European defense readiness and support Ukraine's defense industry ( "The UK should help coordinate support for Ukraine by backing EU defence initiatives"; Chatham House; 19 March, 2024). UK backed plan to fund Ukrainian war efforts from frozen Russian assets was approved at G7 Italy this year ( "G7 agrees $50bn loan for Ukraine from Russian assets"; BBC News; 14 June, 2024). Currently, Britain needs to tackle the capability gap problem for "the job so fun as to shoot down bad guys" around the world. It faces both an imminent threat like Russia and a long-term threat like China. Along with defense spending increase, rearmament plans should focus on real capability against those threats ( "Britain must rearm to strengthen NATO and meet threats beyond Russia and terrorism"; Chatham House; 25 March, 2024).
After a laborious persuasion meeting with Trump, Cameron talked with Blinken at the formal foreign ministers meeting to boost further assistance to Ukraine. During the press conference, there was a question about the Mar-a-Lago meeting, and Cameron replied that it was just a normal diplomatic meeting with the opposition leader on the occasion of election ( "Secretary Antony J. Blinken and United Kingdom Foreign Secretary David Cameron at a Joint Press Availability"; US Department of State Press Release; April 9, 2024). But apparently, Trump is still a drag in the trans-Atlantic alliance as he rejects further aid to Ukraine. He does not care about bipartisan consistency in diplomacy. Appallingly, he says he would end the war as soon as he inaugurated. Even Russia does not take it seriously ( "Russia says 'let's be realistic' about Trump plan to end Ukraine war"; Reuters; July 18, 2024). The Mar-a-Lago talk would have been far from normal.
As if implying a turbulent dialogue, Trump fellows backlashed vehemently to Cameron's Churchillian effort. Since Trump encouraged Russia to invade NATO countries, Cameron has been critical of his views on trans-Atlantic alliance ( "David Cameron Rebukes Donald Trump's Divisive Remarks About Nato And Russia"; HuffPost; 12 February, 2024). It is not easy to fill the gap in just a single secret meeting. As expected, Trump's foreign policy advisor Elbridge Colby, who was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, denounced Cameron's lobbying for the pass of the Ukrainian aid bill at the Congress as intervention into American politics. Also, he expressed resentment that Cameron moralized the case for Ukraine and lectured it to Trump ( "Trump ally hits out at David Cameron for 'lecturing' US"; Politico; May 2, 2024). But historically, moralism cemented the Reagan-Thatcher conservative alliance, which ultimately brought the end of the Cold War. But deplorably, Colby's comment shows how badly conservatism in America degraded today.
While Colby belittles Russia as China's junior partner ( "China's Russia Support Strategy"; Politico; February 22, 2024), that does not curb the Kremlin's aggression in Europe and infiltration in the Middle East and Africa. In his article of the Washington Post, he does not care such contradictions in his advocacy of strategic refocus on China ( "To avert war with China, the U.S. must prioritize Taiwan over Ukraine"; Washington Post; May 18, 2023). Ironically, Taiwan does not endorse Colby's strategic shift to Asia ( "Taiwan is urging the U.S. not to abandon Ukraine"; Washington Post; May 10, 2023). Prominent Never Trump pundits such as Robert Kagan are right to deny lopsided China-hawks like Colby to maintain the American hegemony ( "A Republican 'civil war' on Ukraine erupts as Reagan's example fades"; Washington Post; March 15, 2023). Nevertheless, Colby praised current Foreign Secretary David Lammy for his compassionate attitude to Trump. However, JD Vance has ruined such a lukewarm friendship between Trump and Labour Britain, as he blasted this country as an Islamist state with nuclear weapons ( "Rayner dismisses Trump running mate 'Islamist UK' claim"; BBC News; 17 July, 2024). Despite Cameron's successful lobbying for Ukraine, the negative influence of MAGA Republicans is still undismissable, regardless of the results of the presidential election. As is often the case with Trump supporters, both Vance and Colby are characterized with vituperative words and confrontational attitudes. If Trump 2.0 emerged, that would be a severe diplomatic drawback for American allies.
During World War II, the Pearl Harbor attack silenced Lindbergh isolationists, which enabled President Franklin Roosevelt to fight for freedom around the world upon Winston Churchill's request. But today, MAGA Republicans drag American foreign policy even under current Biden administration. Therefore, NATO is seriously considering Trump proofing to prepare for the worst scenario in the presidential election in the United States. The most critical point is to boost defense capability on the European side. While NATO member states are raising their defense spending to meet the 2% target of the organization. However, even that would not be enough to keep America engaged with Europe. Actually, Colby rebuffed Britain's 2.5% spending plan by the Sunak administration meaningless. Most of the NATO members does not reach the 2% target today, but they spent over 3% during the Cold War. The real problem is not the amount of money but the focus of defense investment. Such investment on deterrence and denial capabilities against Russia should be spent efficiently to make US rescue operations in Europe less costly. Joint procurement coordination in Europe, particularly among Britain, France, and Germany will be helpful for this objective ( "Trump-Proofing NATO: 2% Won't Cut It"; RUSI; 7 March, 2024).
Currently, the impending problem is Ukraine. At the 75th anniversary of NATO in Brussels, Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg made a proposal to insulate NATO's role in Ukraine from American politics. That is to give more leverage of the Ukraine Defense Contact Group to NATO from the United States, to facilitate the implementation of the military aid package of $100 billion for five years. However, the Biden administration did not express so much interest in this plan ( On NATO's 75th birthday, fear of Trump overshadows celebrations; Washington Post; April 4, 2024). Ironically, the incumbent Never Trump government of the United States is not supportive of a Trump proofing initiative by Europe. Nevertheless, this year will be critical in the war in Ukraine, according to Michael Clarke, ex-Director General of the Royal United Service Institute. Russia lacks the equipment and trained manpower for a major offensive until spring 2025 or later, while Ukraine desperately needs Western military aid to rebuild combat capability to retake occupied territories ( "Ukraine war: Three ways the conflict could go in 2024"; BBC; 29 December, 2023).
The global community is imperiled with Trump 2.0, but the real problem is beyond Trump himself. Some anti-mainstream foreign policy pundits of both right and left appeal for so-called "restrained" diplomacy to make the case against Wilsonian globalism. Among them, rightwing nationalists make use of Trump to advance their advocacy. That makes him the primary focus in diplomacy with the superpower facing domestic pressure of isolationism. Despite his notoriously high-handed attitude, former Australian Prime Minister Malcom Turnbull tells world leaders not to flatter him to avoid his anger. Trump may feel a formidable counterpart unpleasant, but he respects him or her after he calms down ( "How the World Can Deal With Trump?"; Foreign Affairs; May 31, 2024). Cameron told urgent necessity to help Ukraine candidly, as shown in Colby's malicious response. Also, Japanese Prime Minister-then Shinzo Abe told reciprocity of the US-Japanese alliance when he visited the Trump Tower, shortly after unexpected victory of Trump in the election. Meanwhile, former Prime Minister Taro Aso's visit appears unnecessary kowtow to the opposition candidate. Abe's memoir says that Trump talked extensively about private golf even at the official bilateral summit. What did Aso talk to enjoy the meeting with him?
Despite Trump's conviction, Western democracies have no choice but align with the United States, as commented by Leslie Vinjamuri, the director of the US and Americas programme at Chatham House ( "The Global Implications of Trump's Conviction"; Council on Foreign Relations; June 4, 2024). Though Democratic candidate Kamala Harris is surging to edge out Trump, the "restrained" diplomacy school would draw US leadership role in the world, even under her administration. Along with rightwing think tanks such as the America First Policy Institute (AFPI) and the Marathon Initiative, there is bipartisan Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft which is co-sponsored by libertarian Chrales Koch and liberal George Soros ( "George Soros and Charles Koch take on the 'endless wars'"; Politico; December 2, 2019). In order to move America that does not act, leaders of Western democracies must elaborate for Churchillian diplomacy without Churchill's charisma. American allies need to coordinate with bipartisan internationalists to persuade had-wired isolationists as Cameron did. Also, they to demonstrate the willingness to do "the job so fun as to shoot down bad guys", whether by directly involved in military actions or by providing military aid for a nation withstanding enemy invasion. In other words, it is a commitment to burden sharing of law enforcement for the world order. On the American side, it would be interesting if Harris hinted to make a staunch national security team with her pick of Vice President and other top positions in the cabinet to distinguish herself from gaffe-prone and DEI blaming Trump-Vance duo.
