“In Israel, elections don’t end on election night; that’s when they begin.”
There is an old saying in Israel: “In Israel, elections don’t end on election night; that’s when they begin.” This holds true once again, as neither bloc—neither the one led by Benjamin Netanyahu nor the anti-Netanyahu bloc led by Gadi Eisenkot—secured a simple majority in the Knesset in the elections held on October 27, 2026. In a 120-seat parliament, a majority requires 61 representatives; Netanyahu garnered 53, Eisenkot 48, and the successful Arab parties won 19.
The post-election maneuvering has thus begun, with three primary scenarios:
Forming a government based on either of these main options is no easy task; it would require the parties involved—excluding the Arab parties—to, in effect, betray their own campaign promises and their voters in order to reach a compromise. Furthermore, the negotiations are overshadowed by the so-called “Ra’amgate” affair, which concerns Netanyahu’s claim that the Arab parties stole the election result. While the courts have ruled that this incident does not alter the election outcome, it does indicate that the police employed questionable methods to influence the results.
A Majority Government for the Anti-Netanyahu Bloc
According to the final results, Netanyahu and his allies have secured only 53 seats in the 120-member Knesset—fewer than the 64 seats that guaranteed them a clear majority four years ago. The opposition has won 67 seats, marking one of the strongest performances for the anti-Netanyahu camp in decades. One might assume this would be interpreted as a clear rejection of the incumbent government and a mandate for political change—but that is not the case.
A government supported by Arab parties would allow the Jewish-led opposition to control the Knesset, while granting the Arab parties significant influence—without requiring them to take responsibility for policies they oppose. This would also make it possible to fulfill the election promises of the Eisenkot-led bloc: namely, the conscription of Haredim (ultra-Orthodox Jews) and the establishment of a commission of inquiry into the terrorist attack of October 7, 2026—all while bringing an end to Netanyahu’s hold on power.
In my view, the most sensible option is to form a government led by Eisenkot, supported by Arab parties—whether from within the government or from the outside. The Ra’am party was already part of the previous Bennett/Lapid government, and Yoav Segalovitz—a Jewish member of the Knesset from that party—would be well-suited for a role such as Minister of the Interior; he is highly respected by both Arabs and Jews for his past service as a senior police official.
The problem, however, is that neither Naftali Bennett nor Avigdor Liberman wishes to serve in a government that includes Arab parties—with the latter even opposing such an arrangement if the support were to come from outside the government coalition.
A National Unity Government
Another possibility is a broad national unity government, in which Netanyahu’s Likud party and the majority of the Jewish-led opposition would join forces, while his ultra-nationalist partners—most notably Itamar Ben-Gvir, who is viewed internationally as a toxic figure—would be excluded. Such a coalition would command a significant parliamentary majority and could be presented as a solution to Israel’s political divisions and security challenges. For Netanyahu, unity would offer an opportunity to shed his most controversial partners while retaining his grip on power—all under the banner of national reconciliation.
For Eisenkot and other opposition leaders, the political cost would be immense. Having campaigned to end Netanyahu’s rule and secured a 67-seat majority, they would appear weak. Furthermore, they could be held accountable for government decisions that might anger their own supporters—such as the expansion of settlements in the West Bank. It is also possible that Netanyahu could persuade opposition lawmakers to switch sides, enabling the formation of a governing majority despite the electoral defeat of his own camp. However, among the opposition leaders, Avigdor Liberman has repeatedly refused to serve in a government alongside Netanyahu, and the Democrats are not particularly enthusiastic about the prospect either.
It is also possible that President Isaac Herzog could grant a pardon to Netanyahu regarding the corruption and other charges against him. In such a scenario, Netanyahu would not need to lead the government; instead, he could take on a high-ranking ministerial post—perhaps as Minister of Foreign Affairs or Minister of Defense. Netanyahu would remain a prominent national figure—potentially representing Israel abroad or overseeing a key political portfolio—while Eisenkot would assume responsibility for leading the government.
A right-wing Zionist government could also be formed by replacing Lieberman’s Yisrael Beiteinu party with a religious party, such as Shas or United Torah Judaism (UTJ). However, this would require significant compromises regarding the military conscription of the Haredim.
Three ways to resolve the problem
One potential solution would be a formal “confidence and supply” agreement—an arrangement similar to those used in parliamentary democracies like Canada or the United Kingdom. In this model, parties outside the governing coalition commit to supporting the government in votes of confidence and on budget matters, but they do not receive ministerial portfolios and do not participate directly in the government’s decision-making process.
A second solution would be for Netanyahu to agree to serve in a government led by Eisenkot, holding the title of “alternate prime minister.” This position was originally created for Benny Gantz during the 2020 power-sharing government, and it could now serve Netanyahu. He cannot serve as a standard minister, as Israeli legal precedent dictates that an individual facing serious corruption charges cannot hold such a position.
A third solution is the formation of a right-wing government that excludes both Netanyahu and Arab or ultra-nationalist parties, with Likud led by someone like Yossi Cohen—a trusted ally of Netanyahu and former head of the Mossad. This would allow Eisenkot to fulfill his campaign promises while enabling Lieberman to join the government. In practice, such an arrangement would require President Herzog to grant a pardon to Netanyahu.
New Elections
The final option is that the parties fail to reach an agreement, leading to new elections in Israel. President Isaac Herzog would task a member of the Knesset with forming a government. The initial mandate typically lasts 28 days and can be extended by another 14 days. If the designated member succeeds in assembling a government, it must then win a vote of confidence in the Knesset. While the support of at least 61 seats is usually required, the law allows for a minority government to take office, provided it receives more votes in favor than against.
Should this attempt fail, the President may authorize another member of the Knesset to form a government, again with a 28-day timeframe (but with no possibility of an extension).
If this second round also fails to yield a result, a group of at least 61 Knesset members may jointly propose a candidate to attempt to form a government, with a deadline of up to 14 days.
If all attempts fail, the Knesset will be dissolved, and new elections will be held in the spring of 2027.
Ra’amgate
On the morning of election day, reports emerged regarding the arrests of activists from Ra’am. Ra’am is an Arab party led by Mansour Abbas—a group considered moderate, a potential partner in an Eisenkot-led government, and a former member of the Bennett–Lapid coalition. Several individuals were arrested at their homes on suspicion of electoral bribery. Envelopes containing cash were discovered—allegedly intended for the purchase of votes that day.
Channel 14, which is aligned with the government, made this incident a central feature of its election-day coverage, repeatedly highlighting it throughout its broadcasts. Netanyahu himself released videos regarding the matter. The intent was to illustrate the Likud party’s narrative that “Arabs are stealing the election.” Netanyahu claimed that “they are stealing Israel’s election,” describing it as an “assault on democracy” aimed at “seizing the Knesset from the outside, the Islamization of Israel, and the toppling of the right-wing government.” Finance Minister Smotrich demanded the immediate interrogation of the leaders of the Arab parties, while National Security Minister Ben-Gvir went further, calling for their arrest on suspicion of receiving “Qatari funding.”
It later emerged that the raids were prompted by a phone call—an action that would be considered extraordinary in any country that considers itself a democracy. That morning, the acting Chief of Staff to the Prime Minister called the office of the Police Commissioner to relay intelligence, effectively providing the police with a tip-off regarding individuals associated with the Ra’am party.
The police entered private homes without court-authorized search warrants. Subsequently, they shared the alleged evidence—images of the envelopes—with the media. This took place before the suspects’ lawyers had seen the materials, before the suspects had appeared before a judge, and before any judge had reviewed them.
Once the elections were over and a judge examined the evidence, it quickly became clear that there was no evidentiary basis to suspect vote-buying. There was cash in the homes—and nothing else. According to the suspects, it was a charitable fund—the kind found within Haredi communities and across all religious groups in Israel—that distributes money to needy families.
Itamar Ben-Gvir is the minister responsible for the police. He was likely aware of the matter—either informed in advance or as the events unfolded. It is also difficult to believe that Netanyahu was unaware, given that the call in question was made by his own chief of staff. Taken together with the media blitz on election day, this was indisputably an attempt to influence the outcome of the Israeli elections by leveraging the police—in violation of the suspects’ rights and without a court order.
Credit: Directus.gr , Fair useIn conclusion
The majority held by the anti-Netanyahu parties already grants them significant influence within the Knesset; they are reportedly coordinating efforts to replace the Speaker and seize control of the legislative agenda—a move that could allow for the advancement of bills even before a new government is formed.
Opposition leaders now have the opportunity to demonstrate whether they are truly capable of leadership. Their decisions will determine whether these elections mark a turning point in Israeli politics or merely another chapter in Netanyahu’s extraordinary saga of political survival.
The formation of a government could also be influenced by whether Netanyahu—in coordination with the United States, following the U.S. midterm elections—launches a major new operation against Iran. One thing is certain: the strategic maneuvers ahead will make the remainder of the year—and perhaps beyond—a highly volatile and eventful period in Israeli political life.
Sources e.g: Times of Israel , C14news , ynetGlobal , SoMe
The article first appeared – in Finnish – in the online publication Ariel-Israelista suomeksi
