The Kabul Bank scandal is a prominent case of corruption that undermines governance, and an example of one of a number of factors that can drive extremism.
Extremist violence presents a serious threat to democratic values and societies around the world. The last decade has witnessed increased attention to how and why individuals become involved in extremist violence, including “push” and “pull” factors. “Push” factors are underlying conditions favoring the rise or spread of violent extremism (VE). “Pull” factors work on an individual level and have a direct impact on recruitment and radicalization. They include: social status and respect from peers, a sense of belonging, adventure, and self-esteem, and the prospect of achieving glory and fame. There has tended to be an over-emphasis on the search for broad root causes and an under-emphasis on the examination of individual motivations. This tendency has reduced the success of past programs seeking to counter VE. In the future, programming should focus on preventative measures aimed at preempting radicalization by mitigating specific drivers that are known to heighten the likelihood of VE.
To begin, empirical evidence does not suggest a direct causal link between specific economic conditions and violence. Rather than poverty itself, violence seems to be more closely linked with a sense of injustice due to economic and political exclusion. Evidence demonstrates that a country’s inability to meet expectations of newly educated and upwardly mobile elites is a great source of discontent, particularly susceptible are youths. To better understand the indirect consequences of poverty, more analysis of how contextual features, such ideological and cultural variables, intersect with broad and underlying “push factors is needed.”
Additionally, evidence suggests that “pull” factors are just as important as “push” factors when analyzing VE drivers. In particular, social networks and personal relationships pull individuals into VE organizations, keep them there, and radicalize them. VE actors are often moved by a belief in the superiority of certain values. Individuals can also view the world as an oppressive system and make a commitment to destroy this system. Related to the role of ideology, historical legacies of foreign domination and oppression can more easily allow a victimization narrative to develop.
In addition to the push/pull factors, USAID also lays out seven political drivers that are often present in countries producing VE: (1) Denial of basic political rights (political exclusion) and civil liberties; (2) Highly repressive regimes that engage in gross violations of human rights; (3) Endemic corruption and impunity for well-connected elites; (4) The presence of safe havens, poorly-governed or ungoverned areas; (5) Pre-existing, protracted and violent local conflicts that can be exploited by violent extremist organizations seeking to advance their own agendas; (6) State sponsorship of VE groups; and (7) Discredited regimes with weak or non-existent oppositions.
As detailed, context plays an important role in the motivation of VE actors. While it is impossible to predict which individuals will engage in violence, it is possible to identify those vulnerable to violence. Successful programming tends to be small-scale, while also accompanying a larger development mission. Therefore, programming should therefore focus on preventative measures aimed at preempting radicalization by mitigating specific drivers, including targeting specific geographic areas or sub-populations. Some programmatic recommendations include: development assistanc
e that focuses on marginalization, frustrated expectations, and unmet basic needs; and programs emphasizing democratic governance and anti-corruption, thereby countering weak governance.
To learn more, read the latest Economic Reform Feature Service article.
Jessica Jones is a second-year master’s student at Johns Hopkins.
