Liz Truss had already discredited herself with her talk of the 'deep state' plotting against her as Prime Minister. The first passages from her book seem just as embarrassing.
She describes a car ride with Kwasi Kwarteng, her chancellor, after his mini-Budget in which he cut taxes and increased loans: "Kwasi was grinning from ear to ear. As for me, I was ecstatic: we had done it!"
At this point the story becomes dramatic: "Looking back, that afternoon was probably my happiest moment as Prime Minister. Little did I know that the establishment was about to use every tool at its disposal to fight back."
This is where her story goes wrong. Didn't it occur to her that markets might respond poorly to unfunded tax cuts? She had been warned, but probably dismissed the warnings because she thought it would be wrong for the markets to react that way.
She knew "the establishment" would be against her because she said so during the leadership campaign, and yet she didn't seem to have thought about how to overcome that opposition, or what to do if markets turned in the future. to behave. way the "Treasury orthodoxy" predicted they would.
Her memoirs also have no title Ten years to save the West - a curious timetable that takes us to 2034 - much use for the historical record. She accuses Rishi Sunak of wanting to become prime minister, says Boris Johnson was "often ill-advised by those around him", and that she "discovered", as a minister who loyally did not plot a leadership bid, "a growing culture of leaks".
Yet we should not ignore her story, no matter how selfish and conspiratorial it may be. Not least because it is important to learn how someone so unsuitable for the position became Prime Minister.
The lesson is simple. Conservative MPs knew she wasn't the right person for the job, but she managed to sell a "fairy tale" to the party members who had the final say.
The most important fact of her 49-day premiership, the ranking information to be preserved for posterity, is that she was the first prime minister to be elected by party members against the wishes of MPs.
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Previous party leaders had been imposed by members on their MPs, but only in opposition: Iain Duncan Smith in 2001 and Jeremy Corbyn in 2015. Corbyn was close to the premiership after the 2017 election - much closer than people realize, even though we have never discovered how many Labor MPs such as Margaret Hodge, Phil Wilson and John Woodcock would have voted to keep Theresa May as Prime Minister.
But only Truss was actually placed in 10 Downing Street by people outside parliament. If it had been solely a matter for Conservative MPs, Sunak would have become Prime Minister 49 days before he did - and the Tory Party's record on managing the economy would be better than it is now.
This is vehemently denied by Sunak's opponents, who claim that the lion's share of Penny Mordaunt's supporters would have moved to Truss had another vote of MPs taken place. I do not agree. The only reason why several of Mordaunt's supporters later declared for Truss is that, based on opinion polls among party members, they thought she would win.
Truss therefore became the bomb whose fuse had been lit 41 years earlier, when one of the two main parties for the first time took the choice of party leader out of the exclusive hands of its MPs. Labor established an electoral college of unions, MPs and local parties in 1981 as a way for Tony Benn to win the leadership, a reform unfairly promoted as 'democratisation'. William Haag followed a similar path in 1998, with Tory members given a choice between the final two candidates, to defend themselves against a challenge from Michael Portillo.
These changes were contrary to the fundamental principle of parliamentary democracy, namely that the Prime Minister is the person who can command the confidence of a majority in the House of Commons. As soon as a party leader is elected by people outside parliament, the chance of a conflicting mandate arises.
Worse still, it means the wrong person is chosen. MPs know the strengths and weaknesses of their colleagues, whom they encounter in the House, at the post box and in person.
For decades it didn't matter. Benn never became Labor leader, and Portillo missed the chance to lead the Tories by one vote in 2001. Neither Duncan Smith nor Corbyn became Prime Minister, and those who did skipped the membership stage (Gordon Brown, Theresa May and Rishi Sunak), or would have won among both MPs and Members (Boris Johnson).
The lesson of Truss's memoirs is therefore one that must be adopted by both parties: that they must return the exclusive right to choose the party leader to their MPs. Keir Starmer has taken a small step in that direction by raising the threshold for leadership candidates, who in future will need the support of 20 percent of Labor MPs.
But the next big test will be what the Conservatives will do if they lose the next general election. Contrary to the cynical assumption that Sunak would be on the first plane to California on Friday, I wonder if he might stay to try to change the rules before his successor is chosen. Michael Howard tried and narrowly succeeded to restore the vote to MPs alone after losing the 2005 election.
If Sunak tries and fails, or doesn't try, it could be up to the new leadership of the 1922 Committee, which represents remaining Tory MPs, to tighten the rules for MPs' votes. Sir Graham Brady, the outgoing chairman of the 1922 council, who will leave the House of Commons at the election, has made his position clear, and will undoubtedly do so in his forthcoming book. If the vote cannot be restored for MPs, he is in favor of a high threshold for nominations. The committee set this at 100 for the second contest in 2022, leaving Sunak as the only candidate. But if two candidates are sent to members for the final say, Sir Graham is in favor of an indicative vote among MPs so that members know which parliamentary party prefers.
Somehow, the constitutional breach that the Bennites initiated in 1981 must be repaired.
