Currently, Turkey is in the midst of a
bitter backlash against Islamist foreign and domestic policies of the Erdoğan
administration. It is a front line of the NATO operation against Assad’s Syria.
More importantly, Turkey is a strategic linchpin in the trans Atlantic region,
the Middle East, and Eurasia. Therefore, it is vital for American, European,
and Japanese policymakers to understand Turkey’s position in the world and at
home.
I would like to mention some articles in “The
New Turkey” to explore Turkish foreign policy and current turmoil. The New
Turkey is based in Ankara, and promotes Turkish perspectives on world affairs
in English throughout the world. We are liable to see Turkey from foreign,
particularly American and European standpoints. However, it is necessary to
understand Turkey’s unique position between Islam and the West from Turkish
viewpoints. The New Turkey presents Turkish perspectives on Turkey’s foreign
policy, Middle East issues in general, and Central Asian and global security.
Also, foreign opinion leaders such as Jefrrey Sachs contribute articles to this
journal (“Why Turkey is thriving?”; New Turkey; May 30, 2013).
Let me talk about Turkey’s position in the
world of this century. Professor Talip Küçükcan of Marmara University in
Istanbul and Müjge
Küçükkeleş, Research Assistant at a Turkish think tank called the
Foundation for the Political, Economic, and Social Research (SETA), present
basic outline of Turkey’s foreign policy since the Kemal Revolution and
Islamist diplomacy under the Erdoğan administration (“Understanding Turkish
Foreign Policy”; New Turkey; May 17, 2013). Written before the Istanbul clash,
this article says Turkey will implement more assertive foreign policy. Is this
one of the reasons for Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan’s Islamist foreign policy?
To begin with, we need to understand the
outline of Turkish diplomatic history after Kemal Atatürk. During the interwar
and World War II period after the revolution in 1923, Turkey retained neutral
position. After the war, Turkey associated itself with the West under the
Truman Doctrine. This is partly due to Kemalist Westernization in their nation
building, in addition to Cold War geopolitics. At the first Asian-African
Conference in Bandung in 1955, Turkey defended the West. Moreover, Turkey even
supported the Anglo-French invasion in the Suez War, and other Western
intervention in the Middle East. As a result, Turkey’s Middle East neighbors
regarded This country as a Trojan horse of the West. However, Turkey’s Western
alignment foreign policy was weakened in 1960 because the United States criticized
Turkey’s intervention in ethnic conflicts in Cyprus and détente eased relations
with the Soviet Union. The pendulum moved westward again in 1980, in view of
the threat of Islamism by the Iranian revolution, and instability by the Soviet
invasion in Afghanistan and the Iran Iraq War.
When the Cold War ended, Prime
Minister-then Turgut Özal initiated a new look of Turkish foreign policy to
explore more assertive and multi dimensional diplomacies than those of the
past. The Gulf War augmented the strategic importance of Turkey in the Middle
East. Also, the collapse of the Soviet Union has raised awareness of historical
ties among Turkey, Caucasus, and Central Asian nations. Özal launched a vision
of “from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China”, but post modern and civilian
Europe is critically alert to the rise of authoritarian Turkey. Meanwhile, Islamists
and Kurdish opposed mainstream Kemalists’ orientation to the West. Due to post
Cold War self-assertism and AKP (Justice and Development Party) victory in
2002, Turkey reconsiders its identity in Europe, and defines itself as a linchpin
of the Afro-Eurasian sphere. On the other hand, AKP has transformed into a liberal
and market oriented party to live with the European Union. Küçükcan and Küçükkeleş argue hat
Europeans are too obsessed with Islamist aspects. At least, that is a Turkish viewpoint.
The Afro-Eurasian diplomacy
concept was initiated by Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu when he was the chief
foreign policy advisor to Prime Minister Erdoğan. A
typical attitude of this concept is shown that Turkey signed to become a
partner to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) while staying as a member
of NATO. Galip Dalay, PhD candidate at the
Middle East Technical University, discusses this vital and compelling issue (“Turkey
between Shanghai and Brussels”; New Turkey; May 14, 2013). It is generally
believed that Turkey’s bid for SCO partnership is a compensation for the
continual reluctance of the EU to accept Turkey’s long cherished desire for the
membership. Turkey’s AKP administration stresses that SCO entry does not
contradict with human rights and the rule of law standards of the Copenhagen
Criteria for EU membership. On the other hand, Dalay admits that Turkey’s
association with the EU helps democratization.
The focal point is, whether EU membership
is still more attractive than other regional cooperation in Turkish foreign
policy. Having its bid for EU membership been rejected for many years, Turkey explores
alternative systems to strengthen its global presence. However, the United
States regards Turkey’s partnership with the SCO is incompatible with its NATO
membership. Delay talks about an interesting comparison between Turkey and Britain.
Even if Britain withdraw from the EU, its membership in NATO shall never be
questioned. Erdoğan’s SCO bid can worsen Turkey’s relations with the EU, and
ultimately, risks its position in NATO. Instead, Dalay suggests that Turkey
explore realistic processes which do not rule out full EU membership in the
future.
Turkey’s quest for increasing Afro-Eurasian
presence and bolstering multidimensional foreign policy are accompanied by AKP’s
Islamism in domestic politics. These factors lead to assertive diplomacy and Istanbul’s
Olympic bid. However, the Erdoğan’s AKP administration faces domestic turmoil
at present? What caused uprisings, and how will those have effects on foreign
policy? Despite vehement criticism to the government on the street, Turkish
analysts say AKP wins more solid popular support than widely thought among
Western media and commentators. Let me mention some commentaries from Turkish
viewpoints.
Despite civic protests, AKP won almost 50%
of the vote in the last general election in 2011. Taha Özhan, Director
General of SETA, comments that AKP tackles critical problems which oppositions
are reluctant to do, such as changing the current constitution ratified under
military rule in 1982 and initiating peace talks with the Kurdistan
Workers’ Party (PKK). He points out that “fear, feeling confined and
repressed” does not explain civic protests, and more attention needs to be paid
to socio-political transformation in Turkey (“The meaning of the protests”; New
Turkey; June 7, 2013). Quite interestingly, Hamza
Taşdelen argues that AKP captures opposition electoral bases. While the
Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) rejects constitutional change, their
grassroots supporters of nationalist conservatives in Central Anatolia approve
of it. Also, AKP penetrates into supporters of the Republican People’s Party
(CHP) by adopting social democratic approaches to tackle socioeconomic inequality
(“Being the opposition while in power”;
New Turkey; May 28, 2013). Though wealthy Turkish do not vote for AKP, they say
“Let Erdogan win the elections because he is good for the economy, but let him
not make any other political decisions.” Taha Özhan comments that
secular oppositions cannot attract voters in such a political landscape (“What
really happened in Turkey?”; New Turkey; June 7, 2013).
Of course, we must keep it in mind that the
above scholars are excessively generous to AKP. Their analysis may have some
points, but the Erdoğan administration is critically challenged by popular
discontent. There is no denying of it. Prime Minister Erdoğan has not
stabilized Turkey secure enough for the Olympics. On the other hand, industrialized
democracies should not be obsessed with the fear of Islam itself. Europe’s
extreme alert to Turkey’s Islamic socio-political culture, and that has pushed
this country to find the position in alternative groups such as the Russo-Chinese
led SCO rather than in Western democracies. Turkish experts make it clear that the
public is disillusioned with the West, secular political parties, and also,
military establishment who boast themselves the guardian of the current
constitution. The United States fails to bridge the gap between Europe and
Turkey.
On the other hand, Japan is too naïve to “pro
Japanese” Turkey. But has Japan done anything for this country? Most of the
Japanese are so uninterested in and so ignorant of Turkey. Few of Japanese
opinion leaders are in a position to criticize Governor Naoki Inose for his improper
remark in the Olympic bid to stress Tokyo’s advantage over Istanbul. The Turkish
public may have a favorable impression to Japan, but when their country faces a
real crisis, there is no doubt that Turkish people ask help to America and
Europe, rather than Japan, as seen in the Syrian crisis. Japanese policymakers
should bear it in mind, and reconsider foreign policy approaches to this
country.
There is nothing wrong to endorse secular democracy
itself, in view of the quest for freedom in neighboring Arab nations. The
global community needs to understand the nature of ongoing political transition
in Turkey. Currently, Brazil faces a similar sort of unprecedented burst of
civic energy. Are there something common
in emerging powers? Unlike Turkish experts, Americans, Europeans, and Japanese are
in no position of hailing AKP, but it is necessary to examine Turkish viewpoints
carefully. The New Turkey will give some clues to foresee Turkish political
transition.