I was surprised to hear that there were
virtually no differences between Sunni and Shia as they were both Islam, in s special
report of Iraq in “News in Depth” on NHK TV on June 21. That is merely a
wishful thinking of passive pacifism. In present day political contexts, the
Sunni-Shia division poses critical impacts to national and ethno-sectarian
clashes. However, it is not of so much use to argue theological detail for
strategists and students of foreign policy. Therefore, I would like to talk
about some historical background and religious behavior.
As widely known, the origin of sectarian
chasm dates back to the dispute between the 4th caliph Ali and Muawia. After
the death of Ali, the Rushdyn was replaced by the Umayyads which was founded by
Muawia. Since then, the Muslim minority objected to the Umayyad rule to insist
that only Ali’s successor be the legitimate heir of caliph throne. It was this
religious minority who founded the Shia sect, while the majority has become
Sunnis. The landmark of the Sunni-Shiite chasm is the Battle of Karbala in 680.
Upon request from Shias in Kufa, located in current south central Iraq, Ali’s second
son Hussain ibn Ali stood up against Umayyad caliph Yazid I, that resulted in an
annihilation on Hussain’s side.
The Battle of Karbala had deep
psychological impacts on both sects, and reinforced Shiite identity. The first
point is close relations between Shia and Iranian ethnicity. According to Shia,
Hussain married Shahbanu, a daughter of the last Sasanid Persian king Yazdegerd
III to give birth to the 4th imam Ali ibn Hussain Zayn al-Abidin. Therefore,
from Shiite interpretation of Karbala, Hussain’s successors in the early Middle
Age were also descendants of the Sasanid royal family. Even though Iranians had
been ruled by Arabs, Turkics, and Mongolians, until they found their own
Safavid Empire in the 16th century. In order to restore Iranian national
identity since the Arab conquest of Persia, the Safavid dynasty made Shia Islam
as the state religion. Outside Iran, Shias are distributed in the Gulf area,
southern Iraq, Lebanon, Hazara habitats in Afghanistan, etc. People in those
areas are culturally and spiritually tied with Iran. For example, Grand
Ayatollah Ali al Sistani of Iraq was born in Iran, and his surname is related
to the Sistan area in the south east of Iran.
The second point is a mindset of the
oppressed. Today, Sunnis account for 85% of the total Muslims in the world,
while Shias accounts for 15% (“The Sunni-Shia Divide”; Council on Foreign
Relations; 2014). The most symbolic event to show this is the Day of Ashura when
Shias mourn for the martyrdom of Hussain standing against overwhelming power of
the Umayyads in the Battle of Karbala. In order to share pains and grieves with
Hussain and his loyalists, Shiite males whip their bodies by themselves to bleed.
Ritual is not just a ritual. It shapes mindsets of community or sect members. The
choice of sect is the choice of the way of life. The annual ritual reminds
Shias of their religious devotion through pain and plight, and their historical
position as mostazafin, which is Ruhollah Khomeini’s favorite word meaning the
oppressed.
In view of basic understandings of Sunni-Shiite
relations, one of the key focuses is the recent rapprochement between Iran and Saudi
Arabia. As widely known, Iran is a Shiite theocracy, while Saudi Arabia is a
monarchy of Wahhabist, ultraconservative school of the Sunni. This May, Saudi
Arabian Foreign Minister Saud al Faisal invited Iranian Foreign Minister
Mohammad Zarif to discuss Gulf security and Syria (“Saudi Arabia moves to
settle differences with Iran”; Guardian; 13 May 2014). Will the relationship of
both countries improve dramatically? This is unlikely. For Saudi Arabia, “It is
therefore prudent for them not to draw Iran’s ire,” as Iran is a powerful
neighbor (“What’s going on between Saudi Arabia and Iran?”; Jerusalem Post;
June 11, 2014). The problem is, Iran’s Shiite missionary ideology provokes
socially and economically marginalized Shias in Saudi Arabia’s oil rich Gulf
area. Those mostazafins are displaced and live in poverty, while Sunni majority
oil dominates oil business (“Iraq conflict reignites sectarian rivalry in Saudi
Arabia”; Baltimore Sun; April 27, 2006). While Israel regards Iran’s nuclear attack
as the primary threat, Saudi Arabia is more concerned with Iran’s vision of
Shiite hegemony (“Next Test
for Obama: Soothing the Saudis”; Los Angels times; March 24, 2014).
Considering the nature of Iran’s Shiite
theocracy and politics of Arab neighbors, it is too optimistic to assume
dramatic reconciliation of Iran and Saudi Arabia. Nor should we expect Iran to
act as the regional guard. Sunni Arab emirates embraced the Pahlavi Iran as the
guard, because it was a secular and enlightened state, and a vital ally of the
United States. Unfortunately, Iran today is an odd man out in the Gulf like
China is in East Asia. Current Saudi Arabia behaves like Britain appeasing Nazi
Germany. Had America been more Wilsonian, Neville Chamberlain would have stood
much firmer against Adolf Hitler’s ambition. In present days, Saudi Arabia feels
itself less and less secure in view of Obama’s engagement with America’s
adversaries. Basic understanding of culture and religion is so crucial to analyze
current foreign affairs.