I am grateful to my e-pal, 'BOE', for reminding me of this auspicious date which has been the subject of a post by John Redwood this morning. Here are a few idle thoughts on the subject which come to you with the full authority and expertise of an ex-Corporal!
Clausewitz tells us that the first aim of a commander in the field is the destruction of the enemy's means of resistance which in most cases means his army. Clausewitz, of course, knew nothing of fleets and naval warfare but it is an indication of his brilliance that his precepts written to guide army commanders apply equally to admirals. What he was emphasising was the necessity for any commander not just to defeat the enemy by pushing him off the battlefield but to manouve in such a fashion that you surround him and then utterly destroy him. Armies which are allowed to escape even in the most pitiable condition (think Dunkirk 1940!) are likely to come back again later (think Normandy 1944).
Perhaps the greatest example of this on land was the Battle of Cannae in 216BC in which a small army led by Hannibal faced a huge army from Rome. By forming his forces into a convex shape and keeping his wings well back, Hannibal tempted the Romans to attack his center which he graduaaly withdrew under controlled pressure. At the right moment when the bulk of the Roman army was embroiled in what they thought was certain victory in the centre, he released his two wings who came around and in from behind. An entire Roman army ceased to exist, it was, in the words of Monty Python, 'an ex-army'! Even so, It is worth remembering that in the end, Rome won the war, a fact resolutely ignored by von Schlieffen, who was besotted with Cannae and whose plan for the coming war with France attempted to achieve the same thing.
I think Trafalgar was an even greater victory than Cannae because it was, like the Battle of Jutland which was to follow just over a hundred years later, a battle with absolutely crucial grand strategic implications far beyond the tally on the day of lost ships and men on either side. It is worth remarking that Bonaparte received the news of the destruction of the combined Franco-Spanish fleet at just about the time he had won the Battle of Austerlitz, known as the Battle of Three Emperors, in which he took on the combined armies of Russia and Austerlitz and by 'doing a Cannae', that is, offering up a weakened center and holding his wings back in reserve, he tempted his two imperial enemies to commit to the high ground in the center before arching round behind them and utterly destroying their forces. Because Bonaparte never understood the grand strategic importance of navies he shrugged off the news of Trafalagar as he basked in the victory at Austerlitz. It was only as the years went on and the British naval grip of the seas around Europe began slowly to strangle the economic strength from his conquests that perhaps he began to appreciate the importance of control of the seas.
There is no doubt that Nelson truly rates as a genius in the annals of warfare. He combined two great virtues, tremendous knowledge in depth gained from decades of experience in the capabilities of the weapons at his disposal, plus, an equal expertise in understanding the capabilities and variabilities in different conditions, of the platforms (ie, the ships) for these weapons. Above that, and long before Clausewitz wrote his great volumes, Nelson already understood the absolute need to destroy an enemy.
Tonight, I shall quietly raise a glass to the memory of one of the great Captains of History.