Being
Girard’s interest in mimesis goes beyond the obvious fact of imitation. It’s not simply that we imitate others, but that mimesis is about Being, a desire for Being. What is that, being? A tricky word, concept. Consider that a number of people admire some particular (potential) object of mimetic desire. Could it be that, though imitation of some object, we also desire the attention that others give to that object?
Note that this is different from conceiving a romantic attraction to Mary because you see that John is attracted to Mary. In this case you are imitating John. Whose Being are you chasing now?
Scapegoating and Parsons
From my post, 3 Manifestations of America’s vulture of violence, a speculation:
... early in my undergraduate career I read an essay that Talcott Parsons published in 1947, “Certain Primary Sources of Aggression in the Social Structure of the Western World” (reprinted in Essays in Sociological Theory), which has influenced me a great deal. Parsons argued that Western child-rearing practices generate a great deal of insecurity and anxiety at the core of personality structure. This creates an adult who has a great deal of trouble dealing with aggression and is prone to scapegoating. Inevitably, there are lots of aggressive impulses which cannot be followed out. They must be repressed. Ethnic scapegoating is one way to relieve the pressure of this repressed aggression. That, Parsons argued, is why the Western world is flush with nationalistic and ethnic antipathy.
There’s that word, “scapegoating.” But this is the first time I’ve connected Girard’s concept with Parsons. Does it work?
They are very different thinkers. I have no idea whether or not Girard was aware of Parsons, or of that particular essay. Parsons calls on Freud to make his argument. Girard was certainly aware of Freud (and, I believe, argued against him), but that’s no reason to think he knew of Parsons.
Russ Roberts: EconTalk
René Girard, Mimesis, and Conflict (with Cynthia Haven) 6/24/24