When the Obama administration announced the
shift of foreign policy focus from Iraq
and Afghanistan
to the Asia Pacific region, the Japanese public welcomed it as they were
critically concerned with rapid growth of Chinese military power. However, It
appears too naïve for me. Contrary to widespread understandings among Japanese
people including politicians and opinion leaders, I believe Obama’s pivot to
Asia will ruin Japan’s
vital national interest from the following three points. The pivot to Asia is not the shift of military presence, but it
disguises massive shrinkage of US armed forces. Also, the pivot to Asia is not
just a shift of geographical focus of US foreign policy, but a shift of
partnership priority from mature liberal democracies to emerging economies
regardless of the regime. Finally, an Asianized America will pose more
unpredictable stresses to Japanese policymakers than an Anglo Saxon based America.
Let me begin with military shrinkage. In a
previous blog post, I mentioned strategic emptiness of the pivot to Asia from military perspectives through quoting articles
by McKenzie Eaglen, resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute.
Despite rhetorical willingness for strong involvement in Asia, drastic cuts in
defense spending lead to precipitous downsizing of US armed forces, particularly
the Navy and the Air Force. Obama’s emphasis on upgrading military software is
meaningless without sufficient size of military hardware to face off against
rapid growth of Chinese armed forces. It is appallingly contradictory to an
analysis by the International Institute for Strategic Studies that the pivot to
Asia simultaneously means the emergence of the ASBC (Air-Sea Battle Concept) (“New
US
military concept marks pivot to sea and air”; IISS Strategic Comment; May
2012).
Certainly, it is the rise of Chinese naval
and air power that led the US
armed forces to shift their resources to Asia.
However, a scaled down defense budget makes it difficult for the United States to counter China’s A2AD
capabilities. In response to Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta’s TV interview
admitting that the defense sequester will pose disastrous constraints to US defense
(“Secretary of Defense Leon E. Panetta and ABC News Jake Tapper”; Defense
Department News; May 27, 2012), Robert Zarate, Director of the Foreign Policy
Initiatives, raises a critical concern that it will hollow America’s strategic “rebalance”
to Asia. Furthermore, he denounces Democrat Senator Harry Reid for his remark, “Sequester’s
a tough pill to swallow, but it’s a balanced approach to reduce the deficit
that shares the pain as well as the responsibility.” More problematically, the rise
of China is perceived when
both allies and adversaries cast doubt on America’s
capability and willingness to stay power in Asia (“An Off-Balance Pivot to Asia?”; FPI Bulletin; June 4, 2012).
The final point that Zarate mentions is
related to inherent nature of Obama foreign policy. Emerged in protest to
Republican unilateralism and American exceptionalism, Barack Obama gave apologetic
and appeasing speeches in Prague and Cairo shortly after his
inauguration. It seems that he does not necessarily desire to maintain the
superpower position for America.
From this perspective, we need to explore the real implication of the pivot to Asia, since it does not make sense as a military
strategy.
People in the Asia Pacific region tend to
be so naïve as to focus on the shift of geographical emphasis in US strategy.
However, we must not dismiss recent article by a British Labour foreign policy
strategist Mark Leonard (“The End of Affair”; Foreign Policy; July 24, 2012) to
note the other aspect which is the shift of partnership emphasis from liberal
democracies to emerging economies. To understand the fundamental idea of the
pivot, we need to review a landmark essay by Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
(“America’s
Pacific Century”; Foreign Policy; October-November 2011). Certainly, Secretary
Clinton says that the United States
needs to shift foreign policy focus from Iraq
and Afghanistan to Asia. But the wars in Iraq
and Afghanistan
are not for the market but for defeating terrorists and rogue states that brandish
nuclear threats. I firmly would like to emphasize this, because her article on
the pivot to Asia is extremely “market
oriented”.
The premise of Secretary Clinton’s essay is,
“Harnessing Asia's growth and dynamism is central to American economic and
strategic interests and a key priority for President Obama.” On the other hand,
her commentary sounds very cool to traditional allies as she states “We are
proud of our European partnerships and all that they deliver. Our challenge now
is to build a web of partnerships and institutions across the Pacific that is
as durable and as consistent with American interests and values as the web we
have built across the Atlantic.” Though she
says America
is both a Pacific and an Atlantic power, the entire tone leans toward Pacific,
or more straightforwardly, toward emerging economies. More critically, she gives
a “farewell message” to America’s
role as the superpower and the War on Terror, as she mentions “In the last
decade, our foreign policy has transitioned from dealing with the post-Cold War
peace dividend to demanding commitments in Iraq
and Afghanistan.
As those wars wind down, we will need to accelerate efforts to pivot to new
global realities.” Has global realities changed so much? The New Cold War with Russia and China
emerges, and Iraq and Afghanistan
still need Western involvement to fight against terrorists and radicals.
While Secretary Clinton talks extensively
on economic opportunities in Asia, the focal
point of security is how to manage the rise of Chinese military power. Rather
than containing China’s
regional and global ambition, the Secretary focuses on engagement with Beijing and market
opportunities there, despite political risks associated with extremely
repressive nature of the regime. Though the Secretary calls the alliance with Japan the cornerstone of peace and stability in
the region, she hardly mentions strategies to curb regional threats posed by China and North Korea. This is also the case
with other Asia Pacific allies, including South
Korea, Australia,
the Philippines, Thailand, and
so forth.
The above points will be the clue to
understand fundamental contradictions in Obama’s Asia
strategy: expressing increased regional involvement while downsizing necessary
military power. The Obama administration may think of geopolitical rivalry with
China
and other strategic challengers, but they are willing to make compromise with or
even appease them in some cases. The Senkaku
Islands clash is a
typical case. At first, the State Department said China’s
pressure can be regarded as an attack against Japan
under the US-Japabese Security treaty (“U.S.
says Senkaku Islands fall within scope of Japan-U.S.
security treaty”; Kyodo News; July 10, 2012). However, Assistant Press
Secretary Phillip Crowley said that though the security treaty would be applied
to Senkaku as long as it is under Japanese authority, the United States would stay neutral on
the issue of sovereignty (“Daily Press Briefings”; Department of State; August
16, 2012). Furthermore, State Department Spokeswoman Victoria Nuland urged
bilateral talks on sovereignty of these Islands between Japan and China
(“U.S. asks Japan, China to solve island dispute”;
Daily Yomiuri; August 22, 2012). This is a substantial retreat from 2010
position when Former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage even proposed a
joint US-Japanese military exercise to stop China’s ambition to dominate the
Asian sea lanes.
As to the background of the pivot to Asia, we should not dismiss Asianization of America which
is mentioned in the above article by Mark Leonard. As opposed to widespread
understandings, this will hurt Japanese national interest. I am not endorsing
any kind of racism and ethnocentrism, but it is necessary to talk of this issue
from politically incorrect and cold blooded relist viewpoints. As Asian voices
grow bigger in American politics, “ant-Japanese” movements will become more
influential. The typical case is the comfort women resolution in the House
proposed by Congressman Mile Honda. As widely known, wartime history is a
sensitive issue for Japan in
relations with China and South Korea. An
Asianized America will invigorate Chinese and Korean lobbies.
Recent studies show that the share of Asian
population rises in the United
States. As shown in the table, Chinese and other
Asian subgroups are far more populous than Japanese Americans (“The Rise of
Asian Americans”; Pew Social & Demographic Trends; June 19, 2012). More importantly,
while Japanese descendants are reluctant to wartime experience of quarantine camp,
Chinese and other Asian subgroups are willing to lobby for their home countries.
Actually, congressman Honda acts for Asian American interests rather than Japanese
Americans’. He represents the 15th congressional district of California which is
the only minority-majority district among top 10 richest districts in the United States. Asians
account for 29.2% of voters there. According to Wikipedia in Japanese, his fundraising
is heavily dependent on Chinese and Korean lobbies. In view of recent territorial
clash with China and South Korea, and comfort women dispute with South Korea (“In
New Jersey, Memorial for ‘Comfort Women’ Deepens Old Animosity”; New York Times;
May 18, 2012), further rise of Asian lobbies in the United States will jeopardize
Japan’s national interests furthermore.
Some Japanese who are obsessed with Sinophobe
viewpoints tend to welcome the pivot to Asia
so naïvely, without considering the background deep inside. We, Japanese are in
a position to share European concerns presented by Mark Leonard. A shift to emerging
economies and Asianization of America are critical problem for Japan. Also, it
is not regional priority in rhetoric but America’s real strength and the will
for the superpower that can stop dangerous ambitions of challengers and adversaries.
Remember how good it was for Japan
when US
global strategy was based on the Anglo Saxon alliance under the Kennedy-Macmillan
and the Reagan-Thatcher duo. Therefore I regard Mitt Romney much more favorable
for Japanese national interests over Barack Obama, even though he made an inappropriate
remark on Japan.
As a Japanese who agrees to European unease, I shall never bow down and praise poorly
armed and empty pivot to Asia that the Obama administration
launches.