Simhat Torah Day, October 13, 2025, will remain indelible in Middle Eastern history: The Gaza War is over, and both Israelis and Palestinians have celebrated the release of hostages and their ransoms. President Trump – the undisputed hero of the day – gave a long speech in the Knesset to thunderous applause and live coverage by international news agencies, then headed straight to Egypt for his 20-point peace plan in Sharm el-Sheikh in the presence of more than 20 heads of state.
The Swords of Iron War is over. Israel has all its hostages back and defeated Hamas as a military force. As a side effect, Israel won on six other fronts, destroying Iran’s “Ring of Fire” against Israel.
On the eighth front – the information war – Israel is still losing. The situation is now improving as the disinformation conveyed by Hamas and even uncritically shared by Western countries, as well as the misinformation about starvation and genocide propagated by the UN and other organizations, is being exposed.
In the midst of joy, we must remember the multifaceted conflict between Israel and the so-called Palestine and the broader context of the Middle East, as well as the time frame associated with resolving these. In addition to the implementation of Phase 2 of the Gaza peace plan and the reconstruction of Gaza, the normalization of Israel’s relations with the wider Arab and Muslim world and the vision of a future Palestinian state are also on the agenda for the future. The implementation of these entities may take decades.
The beginning of the peace process
With the remaining hostages presumably released within a day, intensive negotiations will continue to implement the next stages of President Trump’s 20-point peace plan. Hamas has only agreed to a ceasefire and the release of hostages, the release of about 2,000 detained or convicted Palestinians paid as ransom, and the return of a Palestinian who died in custody.
It is unclear if Hamas will hand over the remains of its all dead hostages or whether it considers the rest as bargaining chips in coming negatiations.
The situation in Gaza is, in my opinion, somewhat chaotic for the next few days and perhaps weeks. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz announces that Israel will destroy the rest of Hamas’s weapons depots and workshops and destroy the rest of the tunnel network. Of the estimated 700 km long “Gaza Metro”, a couple of hundred km are still to be destroyed, mainly in the Gaza City area. This could not be done before because the core Hamas forces and their hostages were in the tunnels.
During the weekend before the liberation, several Palestinian media sources reported on violence between Palestinians, as some 7,000 Hamas members quickly regained control of the areas ceded by the Israeli Defense Forces and clashed with rival clans. For example, on Sunday 12.10.25 Hamas killed 52 members of the Dagmoush clan, losing 12 fighters themselves; on the same day, in clashes between the clans, among others, Palestinian influencer Saleh al-Jafaravi, known as Mr FAFO, was killed. The situation further complicates the next phase of the agreement, which is intended to include the disarmament of Hamas.
Continuing the peace process
“I can say that a two-state solution is in Israel’s strategic interest. And I know that the path is no less important than the goal.” (Yair Golan)
The central themes of the Sharm el-Sheikh summit are the establishment of a Hamas-free administrative body in Gaza, the formation of a multinational security force, and the disarmament of Hamas. In all of this, a central role – in leadership – will be played by Arab and Muslim countries, who will also bear the main responsibility for financing the reconstruction of Gaza.
As the situation calms down and the international administration assumes a leadership role in Gaza, the implementation of the future-oriented part of the peace process should begin, which in my opinion should include the Palestinians living in the West Bank.
One central issue not only for Gaza but also for the broader Palestinian entity is the return of the Palestinian Authority (PA) to Gaza. In Trump’s 2020 peace plan, this was conditional on several reforms, and in the new 20-year plan, Article 19 seems to be in line with this. The reforms include provisions on the rule of law, economic reform, an end to incitement and changes to school textbooks, and a weapons monopoly for the PA’s civilian law enforcement agencies.
The plan recognizes Palestinian “aspirations” but does not guarantee a state as an outcome. Palestinian self-determination is therefore conditional on attention to a reformed PA.
In my opinion, the time for recognizing a Palestinian state is when the current quasi-state of Palestine meets the criteria for a state according to the Montevideo Agreement (permanent population, delimited territory, government and the ability to enter into relations with other states). In this case, the two-state solution widely supported by the international community could be realized.
Of course, the outcome of the negotiation and development process may be some other solution than a unified Palestinian state. In a two-entity solution, Israel could continue as a traditional state, but the Palestinian entity could be formed, for example, on the basis of an emirate model or be a self-governing territory or part of a federation or confederation.
In my opinion, a good basis would be if the final phase of the peace process that followed the Oslo Accords (1993-1995), which led to the impasse at Camp David (2000), were continued until an actual peace agreement through direct or mediated negotiations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority. Palestinian representatives should not be representatives of terrorist organizations – such as Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, etc. If you remember from recent history, there was no negotiation with ISIS/Daesh or Al-Qaeda, they were destroyed.
In order to secure a permanent peaceful coexistence in the territory of the desired Palestinian state, I believe that a process of deradicalization of the population should be implemented in the same way as was done in Germany and Japan after IIMS.
After the fighting ended, the armed factor that contributed to Hamas’s departure from Gaza is that most of Gaza is a ruined and uninhabitable demolition site, meaning that Gazans no longer have homes to return to. Making Gaza habitable requires clearance work, in which booby traps and explosives in the ruins are dismantled. This clearance work is expected to take at least a year and even longer if the bodies are searched for under the rubble. More time and difficulty will come if the contaminated soil is replaced, for example to remove asbestos, a popular building material in Gaza. However, this will probably be necessary for both the safety of the builders and the health of future residents.
After the clearance work, new construction can begin, and once financing is arranged, it is estimated to last at least 10-15 years.
The Israeli religious far-right’s dream of a new settlement in Gaza, the return of Gazans to their homes, and the tourist destinations of Trump’s Riviera are not realistic for a decade or so. Instead, humanitarian aid – regardless of different visions of the future – was needed earlier and is now even more urgent.
Humanitarian city
“The enemy of a good plan is the dream of a perfect plan.” (Carl von Clausewitz)
Given the time required to clear and rebuild the Gaza “demolition site,” the Israeli government and IDF’s plan to establish a “humanitarian city” in Gaza, which I previously presented on July 14, 2025 in my article “A Humanitarian City in Gaza?,” becomes even more timely.
According to the Israeli government, the “humanitarian city” will initially house 600,000 Palestinians who currently live in tents in the overcrowded al-Mawas area on the southern coast of Gaza. Ultimately, however, the entire population of the area, over two million people, is planned to be relocated there. According to Israeli media, construction could take more than a year and cost up to 15 billion shekels ($4.5 billion). According to unnamed military officials, the project “would take three to five months from the start of construction until the humanitarian city is operational.” Preliminary plans describe the camps as “large” and “voluntary” places where the Gazan population could “temporarily reside, deradicalize, re-adapt and prepare for relocation if they so wish.” According to opponents of the plan, the “humanitarian city” would violate international law because civilians would be prevented from returning to their homes in the north, which would be a form of ethnic cleansing.
Credit: MEE, public domain
Epilogue
“Peace is nothing but the continuation of war by other means” (Ariel Rusila, paraphrasing Carl von Clausewitz)
An interesting detail is that although Hamas is reportedly not attending the Gaza peace signing ceremony, the Iranian president has been invited to attend an event in Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula on Monday. This highlights the changing diplomatic situation in the region as Israel and international mediators finalize the implementation of the ceasefire and exchange agreement.
Domestically, Israel is also in a state of flux. Trump’s 20-point peace plan itself has very broad support, perhaps excluding the government’s extremist religious parties. If the government were to threaten to fall because of coalition members who oppose it, the opposition would come to Netanyahu’s aid.
It will also be interesting to see how the Israeli opposition responds to President Trump’s appeal to President Isaac Herzog in his speech to the Knesset to pardon Prime Minister Netanyahu for the corruption and other charges that have been dropped against him. I think such a pardon would be justified in the name of public interest, just as was recently done with regard to the released Palestinian prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment for terrorist attacks and multiple murders.
For the Palestinian Authority, it is crucial to find an accepted and sufficiently strong leader after President Abbas who is able to carry out the reforms and the deradicalization process, or at least get them off to a good start. Such a person could be Marwan al-Barghuthi, who is serving five life sentences in prison; Barghuthi is probably the only person currently able to unite the Palestinians who support Fatah and Hamas, and as a charismatic figure he has many times the support for the next Palestinian leader compared to other candidates to succeed Abbas, such as Mohammad Dahlan. I think the Israeli judiciary should acquit Barghuthi on the same pragmatic grounds as Netanyahu from his charges.
Neither case (Netanyahu/Barghuthi) may not necessarily be legal, but still legitimate.
______________________________________________________________________________________________________
This is the English version of an article (in Finnish) that first appeared in the online publication Ariel-Israelista suomeksi .