Egyptian Civil Society: Now & Then

Posted on the 28 May 2013 by Center For International Private Enterprise @CIPEglobal

Egypt has been in the process of rapid change since the fall of Mubarak in 2011. So far, the conservative Military and Muslim Brothers, in addition to an ineffective opposition, have failed to agree on a plan to transition to democracy. Moreover, democracy has been limited to episodes of conflict over the ballot box while disregarding its other essential components, such as freedom of association and the independence of civil society, which are inseparable from democracy.

According to the 2012 constitution, “Citizens have the right to form associations and parties only by notification, and they shall have a legal personality and said entities or their boards of directors may not be dissolved except by a judicial order.” Observers consider this article to be a breakthrough in the relationship between state and society in Egypt. Conversely, the new draft NGO law discussed by the Shura Council in April 2013 empowers the government to impose restrictions on civil society.

Before discussing the major concerns about this draft law, it is important to highlight the nature of the relationship between state and society in Egypt. Middle East observers need to be aware that the state-society order in the region is different than in established democracies. In Egypt, the society is trying to emerge out of a state and not vice versa. In other words, the state remains the dominant institution, not society.

The state’s flexible borders are used to contain civil society

For the last few decades, the Egyptian State has made several attempts to subvert the rise of civil society. The state is defined as the sum of public institutions; however, the borders of these institutions have been very flexible in order to restrain civil society actors. The Federation of Egyptian Industries (FEI), for example, is the largest representative institution of the business community in Egypt. It includes 15 industrial chambers and more than 20,000 members and is used by the state as the voice of the business community in all government negotiations.

Nevertheless, the government maintains control of the business community by appointing one third of the FEI board, including the Chairman, and allowing members to elect only two thirds of their representation. Not only are government cronies appointed to the board, but mandatory membership is imposed to further enhance the hegemony of the FEI over the business community. Members are obliged to join FEI for industrial licenses that support FEI financially, in addition to disassociating it from members’ needs. Through such arrangements, the state has been able to control the industrial community in Egypt.

Moreover, the Egyptian state has been using the creation of quasi-government institutions to hijack the growth of civil society. There are various national councils, such as the National Council for Human Rights and the National Council for Women, for which the state appoints the board and provides financial support. Ironically, these institutions are portrayed as independent. With the tables turned in their favor, the current ruling party did not change the status of these quasi-government institutions and are instead appointing their own loyal representatives.  Such behavior has created a relationship of co-dependency between the state and the civil society. The first recommendation to solve this problem is to dissolve such institutions; while this may sound radical, it is necessary. These institutions were created to contain civil society during the time of the former regime,and they continue to survive even after the former regime has disappeared.

A weak civil society

Despite the large number of associations (over 40,000 in 2013), civil society is not generally connected to the people’s needs. For example, gender equality organizations serve in areas where basic needs such as access to water or employment are not being met. These organizations exist to serve donors’ agendas and drain the international aid coming into Egypt. Sometimes these organizations act as a government extension to deliver public services, which grants a degree of prestige for the associations’ leaders in their communities and enable them to perform well in local council and parliamentary elections. This activity tends to maintain the continuance of the prevailing political order in society. Regardless of their effectiveness and whether they are beneficial or detrimental to development, some formal and informal institutions are very strong in shaping politics and the general culture.

Furthermore, civil society organization suffers from weak institutional capacity, in which bad governance negatively affects the overall performance of societal associations. Associations are trapped in corrupt practices due to a lack of internal and external auditing, and most associations do not adhere to a definite vision or mission.

In this regard, civil society organizations need to work on their internal governance and concern themselves more with their members’ and community’s demands.

The informal civil society

Politics can be defined as conflict over public space outside of state borders. Several influential initiatives were pushed to work without registration status due to the complexity of law 84/2002 that is governing NGOs in Egypt. The law allows government supremacy over the associations and opens a back door for the security forces to interfere in their work. Therefore, many movements that are strongly connected to civil society, such as the Muslim Brothers and 6th of April, are forced to work without any official registration status. Many informal movements are viewed as legitimate by society, but lack legal registration.

A key misconception

There is a common misconception that  civil society in Egypt is composed of nothing more than charitable organizations and collective efforts at social responsibility. Think tanks, business associations, professional syndicates, and trade unions are excluded from this definition. This misconception affects independent organizations that seek sustainable development in the society, and it also distorts the pluralist society in which independent associations defend their members’ self interests and rights and participate in the policy making process.

Towards a free society or repressive state?

A better approach to the new NGO law would be to liberate civil society without prohibitions. The law should put into consideration the paradigm shift in organizational structures, which would require the regulators to end  government supremacy over  civil society.

To the contrary, the April 2013 draft of the NGO law (mentioned above) raises anxiety with respect to the ruling party’s commitment to democracy. The new draft is perceived as more restrictive than the former one due to the following:

Nationalization of civil society: The draft considers NGO funds, including international funds, as public money under the supervision of the Central Auditing Agency. This change will limit the activities of organizations, especially of international interest.

Segregation between different organizations: The draft identifies three different categories of organizations; 1- standard organizations; 2- central organizations; 3- public benefit organizations.

Unlike the standard organization, the central organization has the right to implement its work across Egypt and to open offices in different governorates. The NGO law should allow any organization to choose its area and scope of work according to its internal bylaws.  Moreover, there are additional prerequisites of registering a central NGO. The law requires 100 founders from different governorates all over Egypt to register, and such requirements would decimate civil society by putting limitations on  NGO outreach. For instance, several organizations are now implementing their projects virtually to ensure broader participation of beneficiary groups. According to the law, such practices are only allowed for central organizations. Lastly, the status of registered international organizations remains vague.

Regarding the Public Benefit Civil Society Organizations, it is worth mentioning that this category of NGOs was present in the former law. However, the problem with Public Benefit Civil Society Organizations is that the law has public powers to claim rights over citizens.

The Federation of Civil Society Organizations: The federation is a quasi-governmental institution that theoretically holds negotiations on behalf of the entire civil society with the government. The law authorizes some powers to the federation as a medium for the government interference in the civil society.  The federation itself is very weak internally and suffers from low membership. Those who join do so in order to receive direct benefits, such as Pilgrimage visas or direct government funding opportunities.

Registration complexity: Although the constitution grants the right to citizens to establish associations only by notification, the legal definition of notification is complex. It requires the founders to go through lengthy and cumbersome bureaucratic procedures such as the submission of bylaws.

The NGO draft law does not contribute to the democratization process and continues to restrict the work of civil society in Egypt. International development efforts are perceived by law makers as a threat to Egyptian national security; a justification that was over-used by the former regime.

Note: this post discusses the April draft submitted to the Shura Council, which is not a final draft. Seif El Khawanky is Program Officer in CIPE’s Egypt office.