Before I switched airplanes earlier this year, I had become accustomed to being the more experienced of the two pilots in the cockpit. With 13 years and just over 9,000 hours in the right seat of the MD80, most of the captains I flew with had accumulated more total time than me, but few had as much time in type. Now I'm the new guy. I took a quick look at my logbook this morning and noted that I've logged just under 15,000 hours of flight time, more than 6,000 landings and just under 2,000 instrument approaches since I started flying in 1987. But I'm new on the 737 and my experience level is not unlike that of the pilot at the controls of Asiana 214.
As the crash investigation reportedly begins to focus in on the possibility of pilot error and the experience level of the pilots, I feel as though I'm in a unique position to add some perspective to the idea that experience, or lack thereof, could be considered a contributing factor to the accident.
I've always been annoyed by mainstream media outlets in the early hours following an accident such as this one. Eye witness interviews are laughable, so-called experts weigh in on matters they obviously know little about and news anchors draw meritless conclusions that may seem reasonable on the surface, but don't even begin to make sense. With that in mind, I will not draw conclusions here. I don't know if there was anything wrong with aircraft. Although weather seems to have been ideal at the time of the accident, I do not know with any certainty that it was not a factor. I was not in the cockpit and I have no idea what was said or done by the crew. No matter how obvious the cause of this accident may seem, all possibilities will be fully investigated by the NTSB.
I was flying the day Asiana 214 crashed. I landed in Los Angeles minutes after the accident and was scheduled to pass through San Francisco twice the next day. I only worked one of those flights. The second was cancelled as a result of severe flow restrictions caused by the temporary closure of San Francisco's two main runways, 28L and 28R. The flight I worked was an early morning departure from LAX to SFO the day after the accident. Surprisingly, we managed to leave LA on-time and landed at SFO without significant delay. Even with relatively low clouds in the area that would normally slow the flow of traffic, the airport managed to keep aircraft moving with relative ease. Oddly enough, I was on the arrival frequency with Asiana 2144 while descending into the San Francisco area...I found it odd that they chose to use that flight number...and landed just few minutes after they touched down.
The atmosphere at the airport that morning was somber and eerie. I was struck by the burned out carcass of that beautiful airplane sitting in the grass and the flurry of activity that surrounded it. The airplane had not been moved. The tail section of the airplane, or what was left of it, sat on the runway where it had come to rest less than 12 hours earlier. The meticulous investigation of physical evidence was ongoing and the "all systems normal" operation taking place on runways 19L and 19R felt odd...if not slightly disrespectful in light of lives lost and injuries sustained.
Waiting for takeoff on 19R the day after the accident.
I heard rumors the day of the accident about the pilot's lack of experience at the controls of the Boeing 777, but hadn't seen any official remarks until today. Numerous news agencies are now reporting that the pilot at the controls had only accumulated 43 hours of flight time on the 777, had never landed at SFO and was accompanied by what a spokesman from Asiana described as a deputy pilot who was more experienced on the jet and assigned to "assist" him.For the record, there were four pilots in the cockpit at the time of the accident. And while the pilot at the controls may not have been experienced at flying the Boeing 777, he was a highly experienced pilot who had logged around 10,000 hours of flight time in other aircraft. He was no novice.
I shared an experience with you in a post a few weeks ago about a rainy approach to New York LaGuardia that resulted in a go-around. The go-around occurred through no fault of my own, but due to a heavy rain shower moving over the approach end of the runway as we neared minimums. (The video below is not of my approach, but is very close to what my go-around looked like.)
We were unable to visually acquire the runway and were forced to go-around for another attempt. After a quick check of my logbook, I found that I had less time on the 737 at the time of that approach than the pilot of Asiana 214 had on the 777 at the time of the accident. On that same trip, I personally flew the technically complicated Expressway Visual to runway 31 and an ILS approach to runway 22 in gusty winds and rain. The captain was confident in my ability to fly those approaches because he knew I was well trained and had logged many hours and approaches on other jets. I'm not patting myself on the back...I would say the same thing about nearly every other professional pilot I have ever flown with…and I would say the same thing about the pilot of Asiana 214.
The point is that the experience level of the Asiana pilot makes for interesting "Breaking News" headlines and may very well be one of many links in the chain of events that led to this accident, but I do not believe it was, in and of itself, a causal factor.
At this point of the investigation, based on my experience as a pilot and the unusually candid press releases from NTSB Chairman Debbie Hersman, I can’t help forming my own conclusions, but it is incredibly important to remember that the investigation is far from over. The NTSB will thoroughly examine what remains of the airplane and they will analyze the contents of the digital flight data recorder and cockpit voice recorder. They will use GPS mapping to mark the location of debris. They will make note of cockpit switch and lever positions and they have already begun the interview process with flight crew members as they attempt to determine what the pilots were thinking, seeing and perceiving about the progress of the approach. At this point we do not know enough to jump to conclusions.
The Facts
The NTSB held a press conference laying out details of the events leading to the crash. Based on the flight data and cockpit voice recorders, which the agency said contained "good" data on the crash. Here's the timeline:
Early approach — everything seems normal.
According to NTSB Chairman Deborah Hersman, there was no indication from the crew that anything was out of the ordinary as the plane began its approach. The plane was cleared for a "visual approach," but the weather was favorable for such a maneuver. The glide slope indicator was offline for the runway in use. That piece of equipment is one tool available to pilots to determine vertical guidance as they approach to land.
Notice to Airman warning of unusable glide path indications.
Seven seconds from impact — a call to increase speed.
Flight 214 was well below normal approach speed. According to the NTSB, the plane was "significantly" below the target speed of 137 kts. with the engines at idle thrust. Most airlines require the airplane to be on speed, on glide path, properly configured for landing with stabilized thrust by 1,000 during flight through instrument weather conditions and 500 feet during visual conditions as experienced on this approach. While the agency didn't specify exactly how much more slowly the flight was going, NTSB Chairman Deborah Hersman noted that "we’re not talking about a few knots.” The plane then began to accelerate, just over 7 seconds before impact.
Four seconds from impact — the plane is about to stall.
According to the NTSB, the stick shaker activated four seconds before impact. The stick shaker does exactly what it sounds like it does…it shakes the control wheel to warn the pilots of an impending stall. In airplane terms, a stall relates to the lack of sufficient air flow over the wings, a condition that will cause the loss of lift and result in an aircraft falling out of the sky. Usually, a pilot would increase speed in response to this warning, and that’s exactly what happened for flight 214. According to the NTSB, throttles responded properly, indicating that “an engine failure or malfunction probably didn't play a role in the crash.”
One and a half seconds from impact — attempt to abort the landing.
At this point, someone in the cockpit called for a "go around," or an aborted landing. But the call was made too late and the aircraft impacted the seawall.
As of the time of this post, the following video is the most recent release from the NTSB.