A Contest for Supremacy is a book that thoroughly examines the history of Sino-American relationship and provides a clear view of the challenges and risks for the United States as China’s power continues to grow.
Despite the fact that author Aaron Friedberg inevitably touches on recycled opinions made by other Western China experts, he indeed offers unique insights and assessments on this widely discussed topic, proving to the readers that the book is unlikely to collect dust on the shelf for the upcoming years.
Friedberg’s core argument is two-fold: China and the U.S. are on the path to compete for power and for influence worldwide, with an emphasis on the Asia region — a newfound source of economic dynamism. The Sino-U.S. relationship, according to Friedberg, is increasingly intensified while the power gap narrows. Furthermore, Friedberg argues that an emerging Sino-U.S. rivalry is not the product of easily correctable policy errors or misperceptions, but rather is driven by the differences of ideology and political agenda.
At the outset of this book, Friedberg extensively explores the history of Sino-U.S. relationship. Following what he describes as the global shift of wealth and power towards the Asia-Pacific region, he narrates the change in patterns of U.S. foreign policy toward China: from President Truman’s policy to contain China and the spread of Communism to President Obama’s engaging relationship with China, U.S. strategy has changed back and forth several times over the past 70 years.
These changes in U.S. foreign policy not only resonate well with the narrative of China’s rise, but present a stark contrast to what Friedberg observes — that China’s principles and foreign policies have not changed much during this time frame. While history cannot be changed, it does help to explain why Sino-U.S. relationship is the way it is today. After all, according to Professor David Shambaugh, both sides have historical baggage, by which the complex relationship is shaped.
Friedberg has a pessimistic outlook for Sino-U.S. relationship as he criticizes Americans’ heavy engagement and weak containment with China, which he labeled as “congagement.” This congagement, according to Friedberg, is being implemented with more weight on the engagement side. While many optimistic China scholars believe that engaging China will inevitably lead it towards liberal democracy, Friedberg appears to believe quite the opposite. He warns that this assumption is naïve and is dangerous because China day remains under the oppressive rule of the Communist Party, which is keen to stay in power without political reform.
As such, Friedberg sarcastically refers to what he perceives as the “Shanghai Coalition” of American politicians, business elites, government officials, and academics — all of whom are eager to please China at the expense of U.S. interests. There is, however, a famous Chinese saying “chi ruan bu chi ying (吃軟不吃硬),” meaning “only accept soft approach (engagement) and against hard approach (containment).” This expression is deeply rooted in Chinese culture and is echoed in its foreign policy.
The extent to which the U.S. should engage China is difficult to gauge. Whether heavy engagement or disengagement will lead to a more democratized China is not entirely predictable. Prediction, nevertheless, is pointless in Friedberg’s opinion. “Beijing’s ability to conceal its deliberations, control information, and shape perceptions of its plans and ambitions, while less than perfect, is still substantial.” Just as Andrew Nathan wrote in the Journal of Democracy, “No one, however, is able to say for sure whether, when, and how change will come.”
On the account of factors that influence the nature of Sino-U.S. relationship, Friedberg cautions readers that, “if current trends continue, we are on track to lose our geopolitical contest with China. Defeat is more likely to come with a whimper than a bang.” A pivotal point, as mentioned, is that the emerging Sino-U.S. rivalry is based on differences of ideology and of political agenda.
These two main arguments, according to Friedberg, “are stronger and more deeply rooted than is widely assumed, and they also tend to reinforce one another in important and potentially dangerous ways.” Indeed, how can Washington trust Beijing’s intentions when Beijing has an opaque decision-making process and an oppressive ruling method (with violence if it so desires) towards its people? How can Beijing trust Washington when it has always been Washington’s blunt intention to democratize China? As Friedberg sates: “Stripped of diplomatic niceties, the ultimate aim of the American strategy is to hasten a revolution, albeit a peaceful one, that will sweep away China’s one-party authoritarian state and leave a liberal democracy in its place.”
With the existing internal issues in Washington, including federal budget debates and a persistently high unemployment rate, and the inability to understand the degree of the China threat, Friedberg believes that the power gap is almost guaranteed to continue shrinking in the upcoming years. What leverage, then, does China hold in this increasing rivalry?
On this account, Friedberg refers to the Asia-Pacific region as a whole, where many of China’s neighbors are concerned the country’s growing power. However, the prevailing trend has been an irony in that these neighbors tend to be pulled closer to China. Taking China’s leverage in this primacy rivalry to the next level, Friedberg argues that China has the capacity to continue expanding its defense budget drastically without causing any harm to its fiscal situation or to its broader economy. On the contrary, the U.S. simply cannot afford to do the same due to various internal weaknesses, which are ostensibly worsening (according to official statistics, China currently spends less than half as much on its military, as a percentage of GDP, as the United States does.)
Despite his pessimistic view towards the Sino-U.S. relationship, Friedberg offers a few steps or strategies for the U.S. to adopt in order to achieve a more balanced and candid relationship with China. To address Washington’s shortfall of geopolitical apparatus, he proposes to secure and strengthen ties with allies in the Asia region such as India, Australia, and Japan, creating a new kind of security framework, which he describes as community of Asian democracies.
Furthermore, Friedberg suggests enhancing ongoing exchanges (political, economic, social) between U.S. and China with more frankness and openness about their differences. Ultimately, Friedberg wants to see less economic dependency on the part of U.S. strategy, accompanied by enhanced military capability designed to counteract China’s military strength.
A Contest for Supremacy is indeed a well written book, which incorporates unique and convincing insights about the increasing rivalry in the U.S. relationship with China. Though pessimistic, Friedberg’s assessment does raise valid concerns about the future path for the U.S. if both powers proceed with the current trend. Friedberg concludes that a democratic China would not have to be concerned about its democratic counterparts using force against them, allowing a harmonious relationship to exist. This notion confirms that CIPE’s work in the region is imperative to China’s liberalization and to the cultivation of a harmonious Sino-U.S. relationship.
Michelle Chen is Program Assistant for Asia at CIPE.