So, Sammy, what changed the law allowing for a reinterpretation of Miller?Rybar's reliance on Miller is misplaced. The language Rybar cites is taken from the following passage:
84In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a "shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length" at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense.
85307 U.S. at 178, 59 S.Ct. at 818.
86We note first that however clear the Court's suggestion that the firearm before it lacked the necessary military character, it did not state that such character alone would be sufficient to secure Second Amendment protection. In fact, the Miller Court assigned no special importance to the character of the weapon itself, but instead demanded a reasonable relationship between its "possession or use" and militia-related activity. Id.; see Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 922 (1st Cir.1942) (susceptibility of firearm to military application not determinative), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 770, 63 S.Ct. 1431, 87 L.Ed. 1718 (1943). Rybar has not demonstrated that his possession of the machine guns had any connection with militia-related activity. Indeed, as noted above, Rybar was a firearms dealer and the transactions in question appear to have been consistent with that business activity.
Even more ridiculous, how can something which refers to Congress's power under Article I, Section 8, Clause 16 apply to the states?
How could you attach your name to such pieces of bullshit as the Heller-McDonald decisions?